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Abstract 
Over the past decade, scholarly interest concerning the use of limitations to 
constrain government spending and taxing has noticeably increased. The call 
for constitutional restrictions can be credited, in part, to Washington's 
apparent inability to legislate any significant reductions in government 
expenditures or in the size of the national debt. At the present time, the 
federal government is far from instituting any constitutional limitations on 
spending or borrowing; however, the states have incorporated many controls 
on revenues and expenditures, the oldest being strictures on full faith and 
credit borrowing. This dissertations examines the efficacy of these restrictions 
on borrowing across the states (excluding Alaska) for the period dating from 
1961 to 1990 and also studies the limitations on taxing and spending 
synonymous with the Tax Revolt. 
We include socio-economic information in our calculations to control for factors 
Vl 
other than the institutional variables that affect state borrowing levels. Our 
results show that certain constitutional restrictions (in particular, the 
referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit) are more effective than 
others. The apparent ineffectiveness of other limitations, such as the flexible 
debt limit, seem related to the bindingness of the limitations in at least half 
of the cases. Other variables, such as crime rates, number of schoolage 
children, and state personal income do affect the levels of full faith and credit 
debt, but not as strongly as the limitations. While some degree of 
circumvention can be detected (the amount of full faith and credit debt does 
inversely affect the levels ofnonguaranteed debt), it is so small when compared 
to the effectiveness of the constitutional restrictions that it is almost negligible. 
The examination of the tax revolt era limitations yielded quite similar 
conclusions, with the additional fact that constitutional restrictions appear 
more binding than statutory ones. Our research demonstrates that 
constitutional limitations on borrowing can be applied effectively to constrain 
excessive borrowing, but caution must be used. The efficacy of these 
restrictions decrease dramatically as the number of loopholes increase. 
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1.0. The Rationale for Constitutional Limitations on Fiscal Policy 
Choices 
Sparked by the Tax Revolt era, scholarly interest concerning the use of 
constitutional limitations to control government spending and taxing has 
increased over the past decade. In recent years this interest has focused upon 
the passage of a Balanced Budget Amendment that would require the federal 
government to balance its budget on a yearly basis. The call for such a 
constitutional restriction can be credited, in part, to Washington's apparent 
inability to legislate any significant reductions in spending or in the size of the 
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national debt. Since the early 1980s, Washington has been synonymous with 
gridlock--Republicans and Democrats have had great difficulties seeing eye to 
eye on spending cuts and/or tax increases. Indeed, both houses of Congress 
recently approved the Clinton administration's $496 billion deficit reduction 
plan by the narrowest of margins (by two votes in the House and by one vote 
in the Senate), reflecting the deep division over how the government should 
deal with the problem. 
Taxes pay for a significant portion of government expenditures. Increasing 
taxes, however, is politically unpopular, though most people value spending 
programs that personally benefit them. How do government officials reconcile 
these obviously divergent interests? They borrow. Because legislators tend to 
support spending programs that help their reelection bids, but oppose higher 
taxes, there is, it would seem, a borrowing bias built into the representative 
system. Buchanan (1958) blames democratic government itself for creating the 
bias. He argues, in effect, that democracy can be equated with deficits (p.157): 
... the individual when making his choice between the public debt-public 
expenditure and the no debt-no expenditure alternatives will always tend to 
favor the former over the latter. In such cases, the choice processes usually 
embodied in democratic institutions cannot be expected to provide correct 
decisions, upon any criterion of correctness. The individual chooser cannot 
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fairly compare benefits and costs ... even if the decision making assumes the ideal 
or town-meeting form. 
The ability to borrow makes it more difficult to weigh the benefits versus the 
costs of a project because the burden of repayment is placed on future 
generations. Buchanan (1967) argues further that "Borrowing makes 
individuals more reluctant to levy current taxes upon themselves and others, 
and less reluctant to expand public spending programs" (p.l04). According to 
Buchanan, the only way to curb deficits created by democracy is to constrain 
the growth of spending and borrowing via constitutional tax and expenditure 
limitations. 
But just how effective are such limitations? Presumably, such a restriction is 
not subject to legislative manipulation; therefore, it would produce better 
results than standard legislation (e.g., Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) which can 
be overturned as easily as it was enacted. This dissertation focuses specifically 
on answering the question because it will inform us if, and to what extent, we 
can prevent or correct undesirable political outcomes such as overspending, 
and if constitutional restrictions are as binding as they are argued to be. 
Before considering the efficacy of constitutional limitations, however, let us 
examine in greater detail the overspending/borrowing syndrome. According to 
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Buchanan (1967) democracy coupled with human nature leads to deficits. In 
his model, the public is particularly concerned with its present well being, not 
the welfare of future generations. More government borrowing used for 
current expenditures increases the public's short-term wealth; therefore, it is 
rational for the public to desire a policy that benefits present consumption 
without regard for future generations. Buchanan's argument suggests 
democracy encourages legislator's to follows their constituencies preferences--
that is, to borrow more. Barro (1989) disagrees with Buchanan's reasoning 
because it assumes parents do not care about their children's future. His 
research (and others) has shown that intergenerational transfers or bequests 
occur. As Barro reasons, "bequests arise if parents love their children enough--
a condition made plausible by the fact that the parents decided to have the 
children in the first place" (p. 207). If parents care about their children's 
future, then Buchanan's conclusions do not hold absolutely (Barro 1989). To 
the extent the welfare of future generations is discounted, Buchanan's point 
obtains legitimacy. 
Another explanation for the overspending/borrowing syndrome is grounded in 
the design of the legislature itself. By this argument, the dynamics of group 
interaction under the system created by the Federalists does not encourage 
legislators to make decisions that yield (net) beneficial results; it in fact 
promotes the opposite, generating undesirable outcomes. Why doesn't the 
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system prevent the adoption of such policies? There are three interrelated 
reasons (we detail them in greater detail in the Appendix). 
First, because of institutional factors such as lobbying and incumbency 
advantage, elections do not ensure direct representation of constituency 
interests and act, at best, as a negative sanction. A representative may favor 
a policy promoted by a coalition of minorities because their contributions play 
an important role in his reelection campaign. The general public is often too 
disorganized to lobby against a well-focused coalition. In addition to interest 
groups, PACs actively support incumbents with a favorable disposition to their 
cause. Incumbents have a disproportionate advantage over challengers. Their 
name is already somewhat familiar to the general public, and with franking 
privileges such as free postal usage, they can build upon this fact. By bringing 
home programs to his district, the incumbent can assure his favorable position. 
As long as the benefits to a constituency outweigh the costs they must assume, 
members of a legislator's district will support him (most noticeably by voting 
for him on election day). This reward system encourages legislators to approve 
policy if his district receives a net benefit, which may lead to an overspending 
bias. 
Second, the legislature is not a democracy, but a hierarchical organization that 
vests a tremendous amount of agenda control power in the hands of a few top 
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members (e.g., Speaker, chairman). Setting the order of the voting agenda is 
a powerful tool because it can ultimately affect the outcome of a vote. The 
power to set the agenda gives key members what Ferejohn (197 4) terms 
"relative veto power." These individuals may threaten a reversion to the status 
quo if their position is not accepted. "High demand" bureaus and committees 
may use this strategy to give the legislature as a whole take-it-or-leave-it 
proposals. They may carry through with such a threat by promising to block 
comparable policy on the floor of the legislature. When faced with such a 
choice, non-committee members of the legislature often do not find it 
advantageous to fight such influential congressmen because of the high costs 
involved. A bargaining process ensues that often results in more programs 
being approved (and more spending/borrowing occurring to pay for new policy) 
than is optimal. 
Lastly, because most legislation requires a majority vote for passage, members 
are inclined to collude with each other to ensure their projects are approved. 
Vote trading allows programs to be enacted that otherwise would fail. In 
theory, if a legislator is able to convince a simple majority of his fellow 
representatives to vote in favor of his program, then it will be approved. 
Empirical evidence (Ferejohn 1974, Weingast 1979), however, shows that such 
trading often reaches universal proportions. Through universalism, everyone 
receives some benefits; whereas, within a minimum winning coalition, only 
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those within the coalition receive the benefits. Given this fact, most legislators 
will prefer the certainty of universalism over the risks associated with a 
coalition. In either case, these trades can have outcomes that are particularly 
undesirable because of their inefficiency (e.g., pork barrel legislation), but 
legislators receive support in the form of votes from their constituency if the 
programs are passed because of the positive net benefits associated with the 
new policy. The individual costs are small because they are spread across all 
districts. Thus, vote trading, in particular via universalism, leads to an 
overspending/borrowing bias because of the suboptimal number of new policies 
being approved by the legislature. 
The arguments presented above suggest several factors that promote an 
overspending/borrowing bias. First, a benefit-cost ratio system skewed in the 
direction of creating more projects may contribute to excessive spending. So 
can take-it-or-leave-it proposals issued by powerful members or coalitions in 
the legislature. Finally, omnibus legislation, especially via universalism, and 
logrolling may create more projects that would not exist under a non-
dealmaking system. In the case of spending programs, it can lead to 
suboptimal, pork barrel legislation. Using a simple example to explore this 
argument, if we have the following preferences and a majority rule power 
structure, we see that an outcome other than the status quo (that is, no 


















Given majority rule voting, if each legislator votes for the project he prefers, 
as well as the other projects, then all three are approved. This result is Pareto 
inferior to the status quo, however, because the social costs are greater than 
the social benefits (-$7.8M compared to $4.8M). As discussed earlier, a 
powerful agenda setter can manipulate majority rule outcomes by pairing 
certain choices together or by aiding the formation of certain coalitions, leading 
to undesirable outcomes as demonstrated by this example. 
Ferejohn (197 4) concurs with these findings: 
The principal institutional features leading to overspending in public works are 
those that constitute the very basis of representative government as it exists in 
the United States: geographic representation, majority rule, and the committee 
system (p. 252). 
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These features of representative government, in short, create a situation ripe 
for pork barrel politics, usually through omnibus legislation and logrolling. All 
of the projects that are authorized (inefficient or not), particularly the ones 
that require building infrastructure, come with a price tag, and the social costs 
may not exceed the social benefits. 
1.1 The Use of Limitations 
What can be done to encourage legislators to avoid promoting undesirable 
policies? In the Federalist Paper #51, Madison advocates constitutional 
limitations to constrain the choices of democratically elected officials (much 
like a system of checks and balances), though, he never discusses using such 
limits to specifically control government overspending or excessive borrowing. 
In more recent years, however, politicians and citizens alike have supported 
enacting a constitutional amendment requiring the federal government to 
balance its budget on a fiscal year basis. This is not a new phenomena, 
though, for the state and local levels of government have enacted various forms 
ofborrowing and spending limitations, some of which are over a hundred years 
old and still actively enforced. But how effective are these constraints at 
limiting the choices of elected officials? 
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One area of the literature, advanced by Riker (1980) among others, argues that 
rules which govern legislators are chosen through a voting mechanism that can 
be manipulated; hence, they exist only so long as those who are opposed to 
them are unable to overturn them. Riker's argument suggests that rules are 
more of a short-term institution than a long-term enforcement mechanism. 
What does he imply when he links rules with political disequilibria? Riker 
concentrates his analysis on the consequences of simple majority rule voting. 
As many theorists's have shown (see, for example, Riker and Ordeshook 1973, 
Ordeshook 1986, Schwartz 1986), this voting structure often leads to cycling 
and disequilibria. 
Many times cycling results from the majority rule voting scheme; that is, there 
does not exist a stable equilibrium. Riker takes this argument one step further 
by linking rules directly with the design of the institution. "In the end," Riker 
states, "institutions are no more than rules and rules are themselves the 
product of social decisions ... In that sense rules or institutions are just more 
alternatives in the policy space and the status quo of one set of rules can be 
supplanted with another set of rules" (p. 445). In the long run, no rule is 
entirely stable because the possibility always exists that a majority will 
overturn the status quo. 
In contrast, Shepsle (1979) and Krehbiel (1987) as well as many other 
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researchers support a quite different belief. They argue that an institution run 
by a set of rules coupled with individual preferences produces a stable, long 
run structure known as a "structurally induced equilibrium." Thus, the rules 
themselves work to preserve the system, fostering stability in the institution, 
such as a legislature. Shepsle shows how legislators use rules to protect bills 
that are presented to the full House for a vote, demonstrating that rules 
effectively limit the possible choices of various groups. Krehbiel extends 
Shepsle's model by making it more intricate (including committee decisions 
that are sophisticated rather than sincere). Through certain procedural rules, 
he shows many policy committee decisions are protected from facing defeat on 
the House floor. 
How do we reconcile these seemingly opposing claims? Perhaps the major link 
between the two literatures is the time variable. Shepsle and Krehbiel find 
rules to be effective in the short run whereas Riker finds them ineffective on 
a longer event horizon because of the changing interests of those who govern. 
The institution prevails, however, because the decisions are made in the short 
run within the context of a set of rules that evolve over a longer time span. 
These rules will change over time to reflect the composition of members in 
power. This process, however, is slow, occurring most often with changes in 
the governing body, such as the election of a large group of new congressmen. 
In the meantime, status quo policy decisions remain stable. Rules appear to 
12 
constrain in the short term, but their long term effectiveness is uncertain. 
Rules may also be ineffective if they can be circumvented. If provisions exist 
that allow official to easily bypass restrictions, then it is unlikely that they will 
limit choices. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction plan failed, in 
part, because legislators exempted many costly programs from the automatic 
spending cuts, but even more so, because they amended the date these cuts 
would take effect numerous times. Another prominent example of 
circumvention occurs each time the state government of Texas wishes to 
approve a bond issue. Because they are constitutionally bound by a low 
borrowing limit ($1.5 million), legislators must amend the constitution each 
time they need to borrow via a referendum. While this process may sound 
difficult, it occurs frequently. Most bond elections are not held during primary 
or general elections, but as special elections. As one source informed us, these 
elections are usually held on a rainy Tuesday in February in hope of a low 
turnout of only supportive voters. In the long term, circumvention may 
undermine even the most strict appearing limitations. 
1.2. The Current Research Agenda 
Given these theoretical findings, the current research explores (1) the efficacy 
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of limitations on controlling legislative borrowing and (2) the effects of 
restrictions on taxing and spending upon borrowing behavior. Our analysis 
does not focus on the federal government because, as of yet, there is no explicit 
constitutional limit that restricts the type or size of debt. 1 
Instead, we concentrate our analyses on state level constitutional limitations. 
The key feature behind constitution limitations is that they are presumably not 
changeable by the legislators themselves. At this level of government, there 
are a wide variety of restrictions, and they have a quite rich history. Some of 
these limits have existed for over a hundred years (e.g., limitations on long 
term indebtedness), while others are relatively new (e.g., tax revolt era 
restrictions). These constraints vary from limiting the type and amount of 
bonds issued by the state to restricting certain expenditures. Each state 
differs in the type of constraints it has incorporated, giving us enough 
variation to allow statistical comparisons of the effectiveness of the limits. 
Moreover, in the last fifteen years, the amount of financial aid from the federal 
government has declined significantly. State governments have had to provide 
more and more support for various services to their citizens. One interesting 
point to examine is if these restrictions have been affected by their state's 
economic well-being and in what capacity. 
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Finally, the borrowing and spending capacity of state governments is by no 
means trivial. Over the past thirty years, the average amount of total state 
debt outstanding amounts to approximately 14% of gross national product. 
Often overlooked by researchers in favor of the federal government, state 
governments control a great deal of power and influence in the world of public 
policy. 
This research will examine if the constraints employed upon state legislators 
are merely symbolic gestures with little enforceability or if they effectively 
restrict the choices of officials and thus, using Madison's words, "oblige it [the 
govemment] to control itself." If the limitations are found to be effective, then 
these results hopefully can be generalized and applied to other areas and levels 
of government where the legislative system produces undesirable policy 
outcomes. 
The remaining chapters of this research are divided as follows: 
Chapter two considers the origin of the constitutional limitations of interest. 
The chapter develops the financial history leading up to the Great Depression, 
including three periods of financial chaos. It focuses on the cyclical nature of 
the crises: the great expansion in indebtedness, the default and the 
repudiations, and the state and local govemment response to correct the 
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problem--instituting constitutional restrictions on debt issuance. 
Chapter three takes the historical information from the previous chapter and 
applies it to more recent events; namely, state patterns of borrowing, taxing, 
and spending from 1961-1990. Using fiscal, socio-economic, and partisan 
legislative data, we address questions concerning the efficacy of the limitations 
and efforts to circumvent them using various statistical techniques. 
Chapter four concentrates on limitations that came about as a result of the tax 
revolt. Focusing on the period from 1978-1990, we calculate how binding the 
restrictions are and if certain limitations appear to be more effective than 
others (e.g., whether constitutional limitations constrain officials more 
effectively than statutory limitations). 
Chapter five summarizes the major findings of the work and suggests other 
areas for future research. 
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1.3. Endnotes 
l.We will not go into specific details as to the reason there are more limits at 
the state and local level than at the federal level. In general, the lack of 
constitutional restrictions at the federal level can be attributed to the inability 
to reach an agreement on what type of limit should be implemented because 
of strong party differences and divergent preferences due to the diversity of 
state needs. 
2.A legislator does not need to benefit all members of his constituency to 
ensure reelection, just a few well organized groups that have the potential for 
contributing in some respect to his campaign. Thus, these projects become a 
rather inexpensive means to ensure reelection. 
3. The middle demand members are either slightly in favor or indifferent to the 
services provided by the bureau, but are needed to pass the legislation onto the 




We now will discuss in greater detail how the design of the legislature often 
encourages democratically elected officials to make Pareto Inferior policy 
decisions. 
1.4.1. Incumbents and Elections 
In theory, popular elections allow constituencies to elect legislators who will 
represent their interests; hence, elections serve as a tool to ensure elected 
officials are accountable to their constituencies. Simply put, if legislators do 
not represent their constituencies in a desirable manner, then they will not be 
reelected. If we believe this last statement is true, then why do we continually 
observe legislative outcomes that the general public find undesirable (e.g., high 
budget deficits), yet the representatives who vote for these policies are almost 
always reelected? One reason legislators are not punished for approving 
certain programs is that the benefits these projects bring are concentrated in 
the legislator's district, and they politically outweigh the costs that are diffused 
over all districts (Fiorina 1978, Arnold 1979, Tufte 1978).2 As Fiorina (1989) 
suggests, "Political incentives are to pursue local interests and discount 
adverse national effects" (p. 108). 
In certain instances, a representative may favor a policy promoted by a 
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coalition of minorities. Special interest groups influence public policy by 
lobbying Congress and promoting their opinions on legislative issues. Their 
contributions to a representative's reelection campaign, most noticeably in the 
form of financial support, also play an important role. Special interest groups 
target and contribute resources to representatives that they share policy 
beliefs, which give these coalitions the highest probability that their 
preferences will be turned into policy. Fiorina (1989) notes "A large well-
endowed, national organization can persuade a majority of Congress to act 
counter to their normal tendencies" (p. 109). The most effective groups keep 
their list of issues to support short. They generate significant resources for 
their cause because they have well-defined goals that enable them to reach the 
appropriate constituency (Aldrich et al. 1986). These coalitions often succeed 
even though their interests are in the minority because the general public finds 
it difficult to organize any effective opposition group. 
In addition to support from interest groups, financial donations from political 
action committees (PACs) tip the scale in favor of the incumbent. A change in 
campaign election rules in the early 1970s gave rise to political action 
committees. Prior to the legislation, a great deal of concern was expressed 
regarding the power of special interest groups and their electioneering 
practices. Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 
require candidates to disclose all donations over $100 and to limit campaign 
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contributions. This Act, however, also allowed business firms and labor unions 
to pay the operating costs of political actions committees that sought 
contributions from members of these organizations. Since their establishment, 
PACs have donated disproportionate sums to incumbents to aid their reelection 
campaign. In 1978, the average congressman running for reelection received 
27% of his treasury from PACs; by contrast, the average challenger received 
less than 13% (Sabato 1981, 270). This factor, among the others already 
discussed, give the incumbent a significant advantage over not only his 
opponent, but over constituency members that wish to use the election process 
as a negative sanction. 
Using elections to discipline representative behavior ex-post may prove 
difficult because of incumbency advantage (Sabato 1981, Aldrich et al. 1986, 
Fiorina 1989). One powerful advantage an incumbent has over his opponent 
is name recognition. An incumbent representative's name will generate votes 
among uninformed voters who simply look for a familiar name on the ballot. 
Much of the name recognition is cultivated through mailings. Franking 
privileges such as free postal usage for political purposes allow incumbents to 
reach those constituents that they may not through television or the 
newspaper. It is very important for incumbents to cultivate what Fenno (1978) 
calls "home style"; that is, interaction with their constituents to keep their 
supporters informed of their actions in Washington and to develop trust, thus 
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insuring their reelection bid. It is this individual relationship with their 
constituents that allows congressmen to be loved while Congress itself (a 
complex, non-human institution) can be hated (Fenno 1974). Representatives, 
according to Fiorina (1980), have shied away from collective responsibility 
because their party's abilities to protect them against adversity has declined 
in recent years. When problems arise, most individual Congressmen place the 
blame on Congress or the White House. Many Americans appear to accept 
their reasoning: a recent Gallup poll (July 1993) showed that 60% of 
Americans blame Congress for economic problems but a majority of the same 
people would reelect their Congressmen. 
Thus, elections do not prevent undesirable policies from being chosen because 
this connection can be "short-circuited." That is, elected officials calculate the 
economic and political benefit-cost ratio for a project prior to supporting it 
(Ferejohn 1974). So long as the political benefits to them outweigh the costs, 
they approve it. In most cases the political benefits provided are great because 
they are concentrated in a small area, and the costs are low because they are 
diffused across all districts. In many cases, however, lobbying influences the 
choice of policy not in the direction of benefitting a majority of constituents, 
but towards the interests of a small, "high demand" minority. Sanctioning the 
legislator does not always work because it is difficult to organize the general 
public and because of the political advantage that the incumbent has over his 
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opponent. 
1.4.2. The Legislative Hierarchy 
While representative government promotes direct democracy through the 
popular election oflegislators (even though the process may be biased), one can 
argue that the legislature itself cannot be characterized as a democratic 
organization. Power is not spread equally across all members. Dahl and 
Lindblom (1953) find that "many strategically placed leaders who represent 
minorities are in a position to insist on their demands through bargaining" (p. 
337). The hierarchical system places certain officials, in particular, committee 
chairmen, ranking committee members, and party leaders, in positions of great 
control. A committee chairman's power, for example, comes from his ability to 
set the agenda for voting on bills. This tool is quite powerful because it gives 
the chairman considerable control over the outcome of the vote. 
McKelvey (1976) demonstrates, given a Euclidean metric space, that a majority 
rule social choice ordering in an intransitive environment results in cycling 
over the entire space. This finding suggests that any outcome on an agenda 
may be achieved; thus, an agenda setter (e.g., chairman of a committee) can 
arrange the voting schedule to arrive at any outcome he desires, such as his 
ideal point. McKelvey specifies several necessary conditions, though, that 
must hold for this outcome to occur. First, the chairman must have perfect 
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information of other committee members' preferences. Second, committee 
members must be able to rank their alternatives without being indifferent to 
any choices. Lastly, members must vote sincerely and not collude. As 
McKelvey suggests, even though these are rather strong assumptions, setting 
the agenda should be viewed as a powerful tool for controlling policy outcomes. 
Schwartz (1986) gives the following example of the agenda setting process (p. 
194). Under majority rule, a three member committee votes on a bill, an 
.amendment, and a §ubstitute bill. Their agenda preferences are as follows 
















If the agenda is set according to standard parliamentary procedures so that the 
bill and the amendment are paired first, then the winner is paired against the 
substitute bill, and finally, the last winner is paired against the status quo, the 
overall victor will be the status quo. If the substitute bill and the amendment, 
however, could trade places in the voting process, for example, by rewording 
them so that the amendment is now a substitute bill, then the outcome will 
favor the new substitute bill (formerly the amendment) over the status quo. 
Thus, the outcome depends critically on how the agenda is set. A great deal 
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of power rests in the hands of the person in charge of setting it--namely, the 
committee chairperson. 
The power to set the agenda gives the committee chair what Ferejohn (197 4) 
terms "relative veto power." But other government bureaucrats also have 
power over legislators. Niskanen (1971) presents a model of bureaucratic 
control that assumes bureaucrats to have take-it-or-leave-it proposal power. 
Niskanen argues that a government bureau has monopoly power over its 
legislative sponsor because of asymmetric information. That is, the bureau 
chief knows how much the sponsor is willing to pay for services but the sponsor 
has little knowledge of the bureau's cost schedule. The bureau, therefore, is 
in the position to make take-it-or-leave-it proposals that are just within the 
sponsors acceptance set. This acceptance set, according to Niskanen, consists 
of members who have either a high or middle-level demand for services 
provided by a bureau. 3 Once the committee approves the legislation, it is put 
on the floor for a vote. Often it passes readily because it is not advantageous 
for non-committee members to either change the legislation or kill it. 
Niskanen's example demonstrates the power that other government 
organizations may exert over legislative choices. 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979) use Niskanen's model in their own examination 
of the theoretical and empirical implications ofbureaucratic monopoly control 
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over resource allocation in a direct democracy framework. In their model (as 
in Niskanen's), the bureau has agenda setting power because asymmetric 
information allows them to know the pivotal voter's minimum level of 
satisfaction. The bureau can then strategically order proposals to achieve the 
desired outcome. The results, however, depend also on the "reversion point"; 
that is, the policy that will be followed if the proposal is defeated. When 
uncertainty is added to the model (e.g., the size of the election turnout is 
unknown), the probability that the bureau's proposal is defeated increases 
dramatically, diminishing the agenda setter's monopoly power, though, never 
completely to the competitive level. The agenda setter still retains enough 
power to get some, if not all, of his policies approved. 
Why are undesirable programs approved by the legislature as a whole? One 
can argue that in many cases, "high demand" bureaus and committees give the 
legislature take-it-or-leave-it proposals. This event may occur when a 
committee presents a piece of legislation to the floor for a vote under closed 
rule so that the legislation must be accepted "as is." Similarly, if certain 
influential members of the legislature (e.g., the Speaker, committee chairs, 
party leaders) promise to block other programs unless the legislation that they 
are promoting is accepted in its entirety. (Barry 1965) When faced with such 
a choice, non-committee members of the legislature often do not find it 
advantageous to fight such influential congressmen because of the high costs 
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involved. Instead of fighting, most legislators decide to bargain for their own 
beneficial programs, creating a "Let's Make a Deal" pathology (Weingast 1979, 
Shepsle and Weingast 1981). 
1.4.3. Vote Trading and Universalism 
In order for a district to receive the net benefits from a project, it must first be 
introduced in committee, be approved, and then voted upon by the legislature 
as a whole. By himself, a representative of the Congress, for example, 
accounts for only 1/268 of the necessary 51% needed to approve a project. 
Given that most of these projects benefit a very concentrated area, there is 
little incentive for congressmen other than those whose constituency receives 
the benefits to approve the program--that is, of course, unless they receive 
some compensation in return. All legislators know that by themselves, they 
account for a very small percentage of the votes necessary to approve a bill. 
However, in theory, if a legislator is able to convince a simple majority of his 
fellow representatives to vote in favor of his program, then it will be approved. 
Vote trading can produce inefficient outcomes that are undesirable. Many 
researchers (Ferejohn 1974, Fiorina 1978, Shepsle and Weingast 1981) and 
non-academics use the term "pork barrel legislation" to describe those projects 
characterized by total social (economic) costs exceeding total benefits. Others 
are less critical in their description of pork barrel politics, defining it in quite 
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benign terms as "authorizing subsidies that boost business opportunities or 
employment within a congressional district" (e.g., dams, military bases, 
housing subsidies) (Aldrich et al., 1986, p. 564). Whatever the terminology 
used, pork barrel legislation is the direct result of a system of geographic 
representation that leads to a "Let's Make a Deal" pathology. 
Representatives do not have the power individually to approve legislation, yet 
they try to bring beneficial projects back to their districts to ensure their 
reelection. This latter point is especially true in our representative system of 
single member districts. Because each geographic district votes for only one 
candidate as a representative, it is an all or nothing situation. A legislator 
may have a significant percentage of the voting population opposed to his 
appointment, so he must maintain the support he has by bringing benefits to 
his supporters and any marginal voters. Trading votes with other 
representatives ensures that these benefits will be received and helps the 
legislator's campaign at election time (perhaps biasing the election, as 
discussed above). 
There are two ways to make a deal in the legislature: (1) benefits can be 
packaged together in omnibus legislation so that enough districts receive 
compensation to approve the package or (2) votes can be "traded" among 
legislators so that each promises to approve another's package as long as the 
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favor is reciprocated. In theory, if a simple majority of districts receive 
benefits while costs are dispersed among all, and if the benefits in those 
districts outweigh the costs, then the possibility is much greater that the 
legislation will be approved via omnibus legislation than by a single legislator's 
own abilities. 
Most early theoretical work supports the general idea that the legislators who 
support an omnibus bill (i.e., those who receive benefits from it) will form a 
minimum winning coalition to pass it (Riker 1962, Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 
Riker and Ordeshook 1973). However, empirical observations suggest 
otherwise (Ferejohn 1974, Weingast 1979); that is, most of these studies find 
legislatures voting nearly unanimously for each package. Weingast (1979) and 
Shepsle and Weingast (1981) attribute "universalism" (the term used to 
describe this behavior) to each legislator's need to preserve his career. 
Shepsle and Weingast assume that a legislator wants to maximize his chance 
of reelection. He hopes that the net benefits he provides to his constituency 
will translate into votes at the next election; therefore, he tries to maximize his 
chance of receiving benefits for his district. A legislator can achieve this result 
via universalism. Through universalism, everyone receives benefits within 
the omnibus legislation; thus, it guarantees each district a net benefit of b-e, 
where bare the concentrated benefits and care the costs dispersed across all 
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districts. A minimum wmnmg coalition, while perhaps providing greater 
concentrated benefits to those districts included in the legislation, guarantees 
only an expected payoff to legislators, based on the possibility that he will be 
included in the coalition. If a legislator's future reelection is uncertain or 
perhaps in jeopardy, then he will prefer the certainty of universalism over the 
risks associated with a minimum winning coalition. 
Universalism, Shepsle and Weingast argue, has maintenance mechanisms to 
ensure its stability. First, a legislator will not support a minimum winning 
coalition over universalism if it means he has to vote against another 
legislator's program. As Senator Buckley of New York found out, voting 
against another legislator's program may lead to retaliation in the form of 
one's own program being removed from the legislation (Weingast 1979 p. 253). 
Second, the repetitive nature of the legislature may inhibit minimum winning 
coalitions from forming, especially if not receiving benefits jeopardizes a 
reelection bid. The security of universalism may outweigh the short term 
perks of a minimum winning coalition's larger benefits. Finally, as pointed out 
earlier, universalism provides "political insurance" against defeat because all 
legislators receive benefits for their districts that may translate into votes at 
the next election (Shepsle and Weingast 1981 p. 96). 
In contrast to omnibus legislation (via a minimum wmnmg coalition or 
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universalism), logrolling provides legislators with a less obvious method of 
approving programs. Instead of bundling, for example, 30 major projects 
together in one omnibus legislation, logrolling allows one project to be 
approved at a time. According to Dahl and Lindblom (1953), "Logrolling is a 
means of getting the acquiescence of every leader who has enough control to 
block or weaken your policy proposal, by trading your consent to the proposal 
of another leader for his consent to your proposal" (p. 339). Logrolling works 
particularly well if the legislator leading it has power to influence other 
members and coordinate vote trading across bills. The reciprocity inherent in 
logrolling works because a legislator will be "blacklisted" if he reneges on a 
vote pledge after he has received a similar favor. Logrolling allows for the 
possibility that at least two times as many programs may be approved than if 
no vote trading occurred. As with omnibus legislation, logrolling creates a 
Catch-22 situation: more programs are approved than are optimal (in a Pareto 
sense) but district members enjoy such programs and will probably reward 
their representatives by reelecting them. The underlying fact lies in this: 
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2 Historical Background 
2.0. Introduction 
Long term bonds issued by state and local governments (also known as 
municipal bonds) are one of the oldest forms of debt in this country, predating 
the American Revolution by several decades (Homer and Sylla 1991). The 
heyday of municipal bonds began after the War of 1812, as America entered 
a phase of rapid industrialization. The country was expanding and more 
infrastructure was needed to accommodate the growth of the nation in both 
population and geographic size. 
The westward expansion, in particular, fueled the need for transportation to 
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connect the eastern half of the country with the western half. Railroads, 
canals, and turnpikes had to be constructed. The federal government, 
however, assumed little responsibility. This lack of action was not due to a 
lack of interest, but to the great demand for internal improvements, far more 
than the federal government was able (or willing) to support. The federal 
government selectively chose to support projects with far reaching benefits. 
For example, it jointly financed the building of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
that would bring goods from the west to the areas surrounding the capital 
(e.g., Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia). 
The states, therefore, were left to subsidize those projects not supported by 
government grants--and there were many. For example, in 1817, the state of 
New York issued bonds to finance the building of the Erie Canal. The project 
was so successful that before it was complete, the tolls collected on portions of 
it exceeded the interest payments to bondholders. In addition, land values 
along the canal increased dramatically (McGrane, 1935, pp. 4-5). New York's 
success in financing the Erie Canal and the prosperity that the project brought 
to nearby landholders greatly influenced the expansion plans of other state and 
local governments. 
Of course, investors were needed to purchase the bonds. During the 1830s, 
this position was filled by Europeans, primarily English and Dutch.1 U.S. 
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municipal bonds attracted foreigners for several reasons. They were backed 
by a pledge of faith that the government issuing the debt would repay the 
lender both interest and principal in full and on time. According to McGrane 
(1935), " .. .it was the guaranty of the state which alone made these stocks 
palatable to European capitalists" (p. 11).2 It made the stock particularly 
appealing to British investors because most of them purchased the bonds for 
investment, not speculation, purposes. Moreover, foreigners appreciated the 
high standing of U.S. national credit, the apparent prosperity of the nation, 
and the high interest rates promised on many of the bonds. 
Within a short time span indebtedness rapidly increased. In 1820, outstanding 
debt among U.S. states and localities summed to about $12.7M. By the end 
of the 1830s, it reached $170M. British subjects held between $110-165M of 
the $170M (McGrane 1935, pp. 7,9). The large amount ofBritish investment 
in the U.S. allowed American financial operations to expand overseas. 
Anglo-American financial houses handled credit transactions between 
American importers and British exporters. As business boomed, an "open 
credit policy" allowed wealthy American houses to issue stocks without 
collateral insuring the safety of the investments. During the same period, the 
federal government did not recharter the U.S. Bank. Individual legislatures 
voted to establish their own state banks to insure adequate currency 
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circulation. The creation of state banks induced a great expansion in the 
supply of money. Thus, "The stage was set for the Panic of 1837 which would 
inaugurate the misfortunes of the American states" (McGrane 1935, p. 13). 
The first blow to British-American financial relations came rather suddenly. 
In 1837 runs on banks in Ireland and Manchester depleted the Bank of 
England's gold reserves. At the same time, due to several investment 
opportunities gone sour, the American houses found themselves unable to meet 
their short term obligations and requested that the Bank of England 
temporarily support them. The Bank of England agreed, as long as the houses 
would repay their debt in full. Unfortunately, the transfer of funds from the 
States to the American houses was delayed, and the houses were in danger of 
missing payments on their next group of obligations. When they requested 
another temporary loan from the Bank of England, the Bank, under pressure 
not to further deplete its gold reserves, refused. Not only were the houses 
forced to suspend payment, "but every bank south of Philadelphia stopped 
payment," creating a financial breakdown between the U.S. and England 
(Raymond 1932, p. 56). 
Resumption of specie payment (using gold), however, soon followed in 1838. 
Though short-lived, this incident should have indicated to foreign bondholders 
that their U.S. investments might not be as safe as originally assumed. 
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However, the quick resumption of payment and the assurances of "high 
pressure salesmen" that their loans were secure eased investors fears 
(McGrane, 1935, pp. 18-19). The second suspension of payments in 1839 by 
the Bank of England and many U.S. banks, and the defaults of the 1840s soon 
changed this view. 
At this point, we should pause to clarify the difference between a "default" and 
a "repudiation." Hillhouse (1936) defines a default as 
... a failure, because of financial difficulties, to pay an obligation (interest 
payment, instalment of principal or total principal) when due, the municipality 
evidencing, nevertheless, a will to make good all accrued obligations when 
ability to repay returns (p. 14). 
On the other hand, a repudiation occurs when, "the municipality shows a 
disposition to evade payment, in whole or in part" (Hillhouse 1936, p. 14). 
Thus, the former appears less serious than the latter because the debtor still 
honors his obligations and will attempt, in good faith, to resume payment. In 
the eyes of the creditor, however, the distinction may become blurred because 
in the short run, in either case, he does not receive payment on interest or 
principal. 
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In February, 1840, the first severe shock to European investors came when the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania defaulted on her semi-annual dividends. At 
the time of default, Pennsylvania was one of the most prosperous states in the 
Union; thus, creditors considered it a safe choice for their investments. Of the 
$34M in debt outstanding, British investors held $20M (McGrane 1935, p. 41). 
In addition to Pennsylvania, between July, 1840 and August, 1842, seven more 
states defaulted: Maryland, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Florida, Mississippi, 
and Arkansas (Raymond 1932, p. 56). 
The federal government did consider assuming the debt of the states as it had 
in the past. During the Revolutionary War, for example, the states amassed 
a great deal of debt. In 1790, a senate committee proposed that out of 
"faimess and expediency," the federal govemment should assume the debt 
incurred by the individual state governments for fighting the War of 
Independence (Raymond 1932, p. 51). Because the War was fought for the 
freedom of the nation as a whole, the committee argued that the burden should 
be shared equally, even though several states contributed far more than others. 
On August 4, 1790, the proposal was approved, and a national loan of $21.5M 
was authorized for the assumption of the states debts. The federal govemment 
agreed to exchange the debt certificates with their own, issuing each creditor 
three certificates that entitled the bearer to "interest immediately at 6% for 
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four ninths the sum, ... 6%, after 1800, for two-ninths of the subscribed sum, 
and ... 3% for the remaining three-ninths" (Raymond 1932, p. 52). The final 
amount assumed by the federal government is listed in Table 2.5.1. 
Table 2.5.1 about here 
Given this past experience, some members of Congress felt the federal 
government should assume the new state debts because the debts were 
incurred for the general improvement of the country. With new railroads, 
canals, and turnpikes, interstate commerce would grow, strengthening the 
bonds between the states (Raymond 1932, pp. 56-57). In addition, they argued, 
the new infrastructure would enable faster and more efficient trade between 
the U.S. and foreign nations, increasing the country's economic prosperity. 
Without financial aid from the federal government, the states would have to 
either raise revenues by increasing property and excise taxes and/or default on 
their debt obligations until sufficient revenues became available. Either of 
these actions would hurt state economies, erasing any economic benefits reaped 
from building new infrastructure. 
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The Congress developed a plan that included the federal government assuming 
the debts of the states; but, it was never implemented (Raymond 1932, p. 57). 
The states were left to solve their own problems, which they did by defaulting 
on their debt obligations. We can speculate that, perhaps, if the federal 
government had not paid for the Revolutionary War debts of the states, the 
states would have been more financially responsible and less reliant on 
external factors, such as debt assumption by the federal government, to solve 
their financial problems. Of course, this is purely conjecture. 
While it is ironic that citizens of a government that was the first and greatest 
defaulter of public debt now found themselves once again on the receiving end 
of such infidelity, British investors were not amused.3 Foreign bondholders 
were enraged that the U.S. federal government would not assume 
responsibility for its member states and that states in good credit standing 
would not pressure those states in default to become more responsible. This 
anger was channeled at both the state and federal governments, for not only 
did foreigners refuse to invest in state and local bonds, but they refused to 
grant the federal government credit abroad (McGrane 1935, p. 269). 
The punishment was short term, however, and by the late 1840s, foreigners 
began once again investing in U.S. state and local debt. While some historians 
credit the Revolution of 1848 and the rumors of war in Europe for the 
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migration of foreign capital to the U.S., perhaps the single most persuasive 
reason for investing in U.S. state and local debt was higher interest rates 
(McGrane 1935, p. 271). 
Anglo-American financial houses protected foreigners by not pursuing an open 
credit policy and avoiding risky investments (in particular, railroad aid bonds, 
which had been the source of many earlier defaults). Foreigners, however, 
were attracted to the higher interest rates that U.S. railroad bonds carried 
over their own railroad bonds and were willing to assume the risk involved. 4 
The financial houses took extra care to secure only the safest railroad bonds 
(e.g., those bonds whose railroads were in a profitable location and owned by 
a single company with little competition). 
By March, 1854, the Secretary of the Treasury stated that foreigners owned (a 
minimum of) $184M of $1.17B in federal, state, local, railroad, and canal 
bonds. The percentage debt owned by foreigners, while not trivial, fell far 
short of the amounts invested earlier in the century, before the advent of 
defaults and repudiations. The decline in foreign investment, as well as the 
refusal to grant credit after the earlier defaults, forced states to adopt new 
procedures for issuing debt. 
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2.1. Constitutional Limitations: The Iowa Experience 
Constitutional debt limitations grew out of each states resolve to renew its 
credibility, thus, avoiding the highly unpopular expedient of instituting excise 
and property taxes to raise the necessary revenue for repaying interest and 
principal on debt in default. In 1857 Iowa became the first state to enact 
legislation to restrict indebtedness at both the state and the local level.5 It 
should not be perceived that everyone welcomed these restrictions or that they 
were easily amended to the constitution. Some legislators did not want any 
form of debt limitation. The history behind Iowa's passage of this legislation 
exemplifies the struggle. 
Iowa's first attempt at enacting debt limits came at the 1844 Constitutional 
Convention. One of the committees set up at the convention was assigned the 
task of designing rules for borrowing and spending. Prior to the Convention, 
Iowa's first independent territorial government (established by the Organic Act 
of 1838) was not subject to borrowing or spending limitations. During the 
period, according to Erbe (1924), "Money was lavishly expended and a number 
of unnecessary officials employed, contrary to the wishes of Governor Robert 
Lucas" (pp. 364-365). In addition, several obligations contracted for repayment 
in 1838 were not settled within the year; thus, the territory found itself four 
to five thousand dollars in default the following year. Many of the elected 
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officials realized that as a state, Iowa would have to project an image of being 
fiscally responsible in order to attract the large amounts of capital needed to 
develop the territory. Thus, some form oflimitations were needed to avoid the 
excesses of the past. 
Not everyone felt that the future state needed debt restrictions. The battle 
lines in the debate for and against limitations were drawn mainly along party 
lines, the Democrats advancing the idea of limitations and the Whigs trying 
to block the passage of such restrictions. The committee on State Debt 
consisted of five Democrats and two Whigs. Given each party's disposition 
towards the issue, it is not surprising that a rather restrictive amendment 
came out of the committee. The amendment specified the following restrictions 
on state authorized debt: 
(1) Referendum of the citizens is required 
(2) Debt may only be incurred for extraordinary purposes only 
(3) Debt may not exceed the limit of $lOOK 
( 4) Term length of debt may not exceed 20 years 
Democrats stated that this amendment would protect the citizens oflowa from 
debt fraud such as was occurring in other states. The Whig party saw the 
restrictions as a handicap to the growth and prosperity of the newly formed 
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state (Erbe 1924, p. 371). The issue was left unresolved for several years, 
however, because the Constitution itself was not ratified. 
In 1846, the Constitutional Convention again addressed the issue of debt 
limitations. Only half of the original Convention members were present, and 
all of the members of the State Debt committee were from the Democratic 
Party. Needless to say, the committee reintroduced the 1844 debt limitation 
amendment to the Convention with few revisions. The Whig party still 
opposed the original doctrine on the same grounds, that it " ... deprives us ofthe 
use of foreign capital...(and) it throws the whole burden of the construction of 
such works upon the citizens of the State" (Erbe 1924, p. 377). The Whigs lost 
the battle, though, for on August 3, 1846, the people of Iowa approved the 
constitution, and by December 28, 1846, both the Congress and the President 
ratified it (Erbe 1924, p. 378). The war over debt limitations, however, had yet 
to be won. 
Once the constitution was ratified, dissatisfied parties began a movement to 
amend parts of it. The opportunity to accomplish this objective came at the 
next Constitutional Convention in 1857. The opposition realized that their 
hopes of amending the entire list of restrictions was slim; hence, their goal was 
to weaken the current debt limitations. Even the proponents of the original 
amendment were not entirely satisfied with the rules as they existed. Over 
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the course of nine years they realized that the term "debt" was not well 
defined; thus, many loopholes existed for issuing debt. The state, for example, 
could still issue warrants (a form of short-term debt) exceeding the debt limit 
because warrants were not defined as debt. 
Members of the State Debt committee proposed several amendments. These 
included increasing the dollar debt limit, nullifying all debt above this limit 
(i.e., the state would not be held responsible to repay any debt contracted 
above the limit), and making the state responsible for debt like the average 
citizen. Out of these proposed amendments, Convention members only 
approved the increase in the dollar debt limit; however, this time the 
amendment clearly defined "debt" as meaning bonded debt, not warrants of the 
state. 
While much of the debate focused on state level debt limitations, the committee 
also sought to address borrowing at the local level. No debt limits existed at 
the county, city, or township level of governance. According to some members 
of the Convention, "One of the great and pressing political evils of the time was 
the reckless and extravagant use of the funding power by minor civil 
corporations for the promotion of banks, industrial organizations, and internal 
improvements" (Erbe 1924, p. 397). Many thought that state officials were 
circumventing the restrictions by allowing the counties and municipalities to 
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issue their own debt to develop land within their borders. 
Because local governments were not restricted in borrowing or spending, they 
could make necessary improvements without worrying about limitations. 
Indeed, these governments issued a great deal of railroad aid bonds 
(amounting to a total of$7M by 1857) because they believed the railroads were 
the key to a municipality's prosperity. While many localities went ahead and 
borrowed large sums of money to finance the building of railroads, it soon 
became obvious that they had overextended themselves, so far that even state 
bonded debt resources could not cover them. Competition between various 
cities and counties to attract railroad investors helped create high debt levels. 
Railroad officials were in the position to make take-it-or-leave it offers because 
they could easily divert steel rails around uncooperative localities.6 Many 
officials feared their city or county would suffer without the new advances in 
transportation and infrastructure; thus, they issued bonds--more than they 
could guarantee--to create capital needed to attract railroad officials. Even 
though the state government did not issue these bonds, officials feared that 
local level defaults would not reflect favorably on the credit standing of the 
state, much like the state and local government defaults of the 1840s hurt the 
federal government's credit rating. They also feared that the competition 
between cities and counties would continue to create credit problems. To 
prevent such crises from occurring in the future, the committee on State Debt 
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took up the issue of limiting the level of municipal debt issuance. 
The first amendment proposed and passed exempted the state from any 
responsibility for debt incurred at the local level. Officials felt that this 
restriction resolved the problem discussed above.7 The next proposal on the 
agenda limited the amount of debt counties and municipalities could issue, 
based on a percentage of assessed property value. This proposal was debated 
in two parts. First, whether or not local governments should be limited, 
partially or fully, on the amount of debt they could issue, and second, what 
measurement should be used to restrict their debt issuance. 
Many local officials did not feel the state had a right to limit their power to 
issue debt. This position was particularly strong in newer counties and cities 
because they had not accumulated much debt. Older, established 
municipalities had used debt to develop their territories, making necessary 
improvements that would raise land values and attract more people to live 
there. Newer counties and cities wanted the opportunity to do the same. 
Placing restrictions on debt issuance would severely limit their ability to raise 
the capital to make necessary improvements. 
What might be termed a compromise was reached--local governments would 
have debt limitations, but they would only be partial ones, linked to a 
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percentage of the total assessed land value. While this decision obviously 
favored older municipalities that had already used capital from debt issued to 
improve infrastructure and, thus, increased their land values, newer counties 
felt they were still better off than the alternative--a total restriction of local 
debt issuance. 
Another debate shortly ensued over how large a percentage of total assessed 
land value should be used. This debate also questioned the right to take a 
percentage of all assessed land values, including land owned by citizens 
opposed to debt issuance. Jonathan Hall of Des Moines County questioned, 
" .. .is it right to allow them to take a portion of my property and put it into that 
speculation without my consent?" (Erbe 1924, p. 408) The issue was eventually 
laid to rest, however, when the majority of members agreed that the goal of 
preventing further embarrassment (i.e., through defaults) by allowing all 
municipalities to issue debt up to the same percentage of land values 
outweighed the rights of the individual. 
The debate ended on March 5, 1857, when convention members approved the 
amendments to the constitution. In addition to the state level bond 
amendments, members agreed upon a municipal debt limitation of 5% of total 
assessed land values. This restriction became the first of its kind in the U.S., 
and remains virtually unaltered to this day.8 In the following years, other 
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states enacted debt limitations at the state level. Older states adopted their 
own restrictions, while newly admitted states copied the restrictions of older 
states. Most states, however, did not initially follow Iowa's example of 
enacting limitations at the municipal level. 
2.2. The Reconstruction Period 
Rapid increases in municipal debt and, in several states, a second wave of 
defaults characterized the period following Iowa's enactment of constitutional 
limitations. Municipal indebtedness increased sharply after 1857, peaking 
between 1922-1932 (Hillhouse 1936, p. 35). The constitutional debt restrictions 
in most states were enacted too late to prevent the defaults that occurred after 
the Civil War. A series of defaults in nine states followed the large increase 
in municipal indebtedness that occurred between 1857-1870 (due primarily to 
investment in railroad bonds issued by carpetbagger governments). 9 Eight of 
the nine states were southern and under carpetbagger regimes prior to the 
defaults. The temporary governments of these eight states, promoted by 
northerners, mismanaged state revenues and participated in issuing "junk" 
bonds for their own gain. 
Foreign investors held most of the bonds issued by carpetbagger governments. 
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Once these regimes ended, southerners, due to impoverished conditions and 
" ... deep resentment about paying for what they considered were illegal and 
fraudulent bonds" (McGrane 1935, p. 282), repudiated post-Civil War, 
carpetbagger bonds, much to the outrage of foreign investors. Many foreigners 
reached compromises with some of the debtor states, but in no circumstances 
did they regain the entire principal invested.10 In most cases, compromises 
were reached only in states where population and resources permitted 
increased taxation. In less wealthy states, where speculation was abundant 
or unsound financial practices commonplace, repudiation usually resulted. 
The defaults in the reconstructed Southern states were in principle different 
than those of the earlier default period. First, the bonds were not issued by 
a government that was representative of the electorate. Second, Southern 
newspapers warned foreigners not to purchase bonds from carpetbagger 
governments because they were issued by financially unsound sources. 
Finally, the forced repudiation of Civil War debt by carpetbagger governments 
fueled the fire for southerners to follow suit and repudiate carpetbagger debt, 
especially when it became apparent that most states were financially unable 
to repay their debts (McGrane 1935, p. 383). 
54 
2.3. The Great Depression Era: Real Estate Speculation and 
Special District Defaults 
A sharp rise in indebtedness marked the years following the second wave of 
defaults (from the post-Civil War default era to the Depression era). Table 
2.5.2 shows that per capita state and local debt doubled between 1922-1932 (in 
nominal terms): 
Table 2.5.2 here 
The growth in population of counties and cities led naturally to an increased 
demand for improved waterworks, paved roads, and public schools. 
Legislatures approved municipal bonds, issued for specific purposes, and sold 
them primarily to American investors. In many states, constitutional 
restrictions still did not affect the issuance of municipal bonds; thus, at the 
local level, industrialization continued at a rapid pace. In several instances, 
the demands for local expansion grew faster than municipalities could provide 
revenue, and the states responded by overlooking or weakening constitutional 
restrictions so that they could issue bonds to provide capital for county and city 
improvements (Hillhouse 1936, p. 35). 11 
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Debt accumulation, however, was not uniform among states, as Table 2.5.3 
displays: 
Table 2.5.3 here 
Those states with a high degree of land speculation and local development 
(e.g., transportation, school, and general improvements) topped the list of 
states with the fastest per capita municipal debt growth rates. These growth 
rates also reflected the debt policies of each state. The more liberal policy 
states saw debt issuance as a means to an end, a way of attaining prosperity 
quickly. 
A real estate boom prior to the Great Depression led to a great deal of land 
speculation. Land values in many areas were inflated because oflocal railroad 
development; thus, municipalities with limitations that were based on a 
percentage of assessed values experienced a sharp rise in the amount of debt 
they could issue. Those governments with more liberal debt policies took 
advantage of higher debt limits and issued a great deal of debt (in the form of 
real estate aid bonds) during the period. 
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Moreover, special assessment district bonds gave state and local governments 
additional borrowing power. They were (and still are) a form of municipal 
debt; thus, in many states, they were not subject to constitutional restrictions. 
Special assessment district bonds provided funds for improving roads, 
constructing buildings, etc. Because the bonds were issued for specific 
purposes, they attracted investors who preferred seeing some tangible result 
of their investment. 
The onset of the Great Depression surprised many state and local governments 
and created havoc in the financial markets. The nominal supply of money 
contracted as banks shut down. Land values plummeted because the demand 
for real estate dried up as quickly as the supply of money. Banks inherited 
land from people who could not meet mortgage payments. Moreover, state 
revenue funds dried up because income from tax collection declined. As 
Hillhouse (1936) quotes, there was "Wealth in vacant properties and poverty 
in revenue collections" (p. 13). The state and local governments were further 
limited because their ability to borrow decreased. Total assessed value in the 
U.S. declined 18% from a peak of $176B prior to the Depression to $144B in 
1933-34 (Hillhouse 1936, p. 242); thus, the amount of debt available to issue 
was less. All of these conditions contributed to the third wave of state and 
local defaults. 
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The greatest percentage of defaults came from general improvement bonds 
(e.g., special assessment district bonds). The overall number of defaults of this 
type of bond was greater than the total number of railroad bond defaults in the 
previous century (though in any one decade the number of railroad bonds in 
default might outnumber the number of general improvement bonds in 
default). 12 As one might expect, bonds claiming the highest interest rates were 
defaulted on first. 
Irrigation districts in the West contributed to a large number of special 
assessment district defaults. These bonds provided funds for building canals 
and irrigation systems that made arid, western states, such as California, 
habitable and profitable agricultural territories. Without the improvements 
made possible by these bonds, a great deal of the westward expansion would 
not have occurred (or at least would not have occurred so quickly). The 
defaults on this type of bond, however, were so numerous, that many investors 
and financial houses refused to carry such issues. 
In addition to general improvement bonds, state and local governments also 
defaulted in large numbers on real estate aid bonds. In most cases the 
defaults were due to over zealous land speculation, not real estate fraud. One 
outstanding exception to this statement occurred in Florida (Hillhouse 1936, 
pp. 85-86). The Coral Gables development corporation purchased land around 
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Miami to create a community complete with streets, railways, golf courses, and 
swimming pools. The city commissioners (four out of five of which were 
associates of the development corporation) issued real estate development 
bonds up to the legal limit, which at this time was 25% of total assessed land 
values. As land values declined, the corporation sold parts of the development 
to the city at inflated prices; however, neither this action nor local revenues 
kept the corporation afloat or the city from defaulting on the bonds. This 
experience, as well as several others, made Florida the leader in municipal real 
estate bond defaults for this era. 
The Federal Government assisted state and local govemments through the 
default period, but did not make any attempt to assume their debts. In 1934, 
the Congress passed the Federal Bankruptcy Act that allowed municipalities 
to adjust their debt obligations under court supervision to avoid repudiation. 
Also, the Federal government helped states increase revenues through 
improving tax collections. The Home Owners Loan Corporation provided funds 
for citizens to make mortgage payments and, ultimately, pay their property 
taxes to the state and local governments. 
While the defaults of the Depression era resulted from a combination of forces--
forces that likewise contributed to two previous series of defaults--they were 
unique. First, American, not foreign, investors owned most of the debt issued. 
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Second, the defaults occurred in an environment with "safeguards" in place, 
i.e., constitutional limitations were enacted to prevent state and local 
governments from issuing debt in excess of revenues collected to meet interest 
and principal payments. Moreover, real estate speculation contributed to many 
defaults, and municipal governments issued most ofthe bonds in default (e.g., 
real estate aid bonds and special assessment district bonds). Finally, while the 
size of the Depression era defaults greatly surpassed those of the 1840s and 
1870s, they were more concentrated. The defaults of 1870s occurred in 
approximately 20% of all municipal governments whereas the defaults of the 
Depression era affected only 10% (Hillhouse 1936, p. 17). 
2.4. Conclusion 
Rising indebtedness and subsequent defaults characterize much of the early 
financial history of U.S. state and local governments. At first glance, this 
pattern may seem cyclical in nature. Superficially, the three eras of 
indebtedness and default shared similar causal factors: all experienced periods 
of sustained economic prosperity during which state and local govemments 
issued a great deal of debt. Mter an economic crisis, the issuing governments 
found themselves in a revenue shortfall and many could not meet short term 
financial obligations; thus, they defaulted on or repudiated their debt. 
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The details specific to each period, however, tell a different story. The debt 
issued during times of economic prosperity served several purposes: improving 
transportation by constructing railroads and canals, rebuilding areas 
devastated by civil war, and speculating on real estate development during the 
suburban boom. The main type of debt issued transformed from state debt 
issued on a pledge of good faith to financially guaranteed bonds to municipal 
special purpose debt. In addition, the foreign citizens that invested so heavily 
in the early debt era played much smaller roles in the pre-Depression boom 
era. The federal government actions also changed during each phase of default 
and repudiation, from a laissez-faire attitude during the 1840s to a more 
active, though, indirect role during the Depression. Finally, state constitutions 
became more restrictive after each phase of default so that by the early 20th 
century, most states and many municipalities conformed to some form of debt 
limitation. 
From examining the details closely, we note that the constitutional restrictions, 
from a historical view, did not prevent defaults from occurring. Even after the 
restrictions were in place, states and municipalities continued to default on 
debt. While we can easily observe this fact, several questions concerning the 
restrictions remain pertinent enough to consider asking them in a present-day 
context: Are the restrictions effective in constraining debt? If so, do states (as 
several authors allege) circumvent restrictions by encouraging municipalities 
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to issue debt? 
In addition to the constitutional questions, economic and political influences 
on indebtedness need to be addressed. Do demands for schools, prisons, and 
other social needs contribute to higher state and local debts? What role does 
federal assistance play in sub-national economics? How do political parties 
affect the amount of debt issued by a government? Finally (addressing all of 
the questions above) which of these factors plays the greatest role in affecting 
indebtedness? 
The qualitative history of state and local finances cites each of these factors as 
playing principle roles in indebtedness/default outcomes; however, only a 
quantitative analysis can specifically address the question "by how much?". 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation will focus on quantitatively testing 
these influences on a more recent period in U.S. history, 1961-1990, to observe 
if present trends truly mirror past events. 
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2.5. Tables 

















Source: Raymond, 1932, p. 51 

















Table 2.5.2 Growth of State and Local Per Capita Debt 
Year State Local 
1840 $ 10.25 $ 1.17 
1850 8.19 
1860 8.17 6.36 
1870 9.15 13.38 
1880 5.48 16.37 
1890 3.37 14.79 
1900 3.03 20.74 
1910 3.57 35.81 
1920 8.64 71.32 
1930 19.17 123.06 
Source: Hillhouse, 1936, p. 36 
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Table 2.5.3 State Real Per Capita Municipal Debt, 1922 and 1932 (in 1935 
dollars) 
State 1922 1932 %Increase 
Alabama $ 20.74 $49.03 130.7 
Arizona 97.76 156.34 59.9 
Arkansas 41.36 50.25 21.5 
California 99.75 165.45 65.9 
Colorado 75.11 120.25 60.1 
Connecticut 55.21 100.94 82.8 
Delaware 60.50 115.34 90.6 
Florida 79.46 345.78 335.2 
Georgia 16.49 33.27 101.8 
Idaho 99.78 164.23 64.6 
Illinois 43.93 141.40 221.9 
Indiana 42.13 60.88 44.5 
Iowa 51.40 93.24 81.4 
Kansas 57.74 72.73 26.0 
Kentucky 14.63 37.79 158.3 
Louisiana 51.04 132.83 160.2 
Maine 31.92 47.79 49.7 
Maryland 55.58 142.72 156.8 
Massachusetts 53.18 89.22 67.8 
Michigan 67.54 149.03 120.7 
Minnesota 84.96 97.20 14.4 
Mississippi 45.09 72.06 59.8 
Missouri 21.37 64.75 203.0 
Montana 81.37 118.07 45.1 
Nebraska 61.10 81.00 32.6 
Nevada 56.70 95.50 68.4 
New Hampshire 25.46 55.17 116.7 
New Jersey 93.08 270.04 190.1 
New Mexico 45.46 60.84 33.8 
New York 117.49 241.04 105.2 
North Carolina 46.71 116.73 149.9 
North Dakota 43.40 46.74 7.7 
Ohio 89.56 131.91 47.3 
Oklahoma 49.69 76.88 54.7 
Oregon 101.31 174.38 72.1 
Pennsylvania 46.55 119.89 157.6 
Rhode Island 53.73 137.70 156.3 
South Carolina 27.23 55.03 102.1 
South Dakota 45.32 52.15 15.1 
Tennessee 40.27 88.88 120.7 
Texas 60.52 127.23 110.2 
Utah 71.75 80.64 12.4 
Vermont 23.43 50.19 114.2 
Virginia 34.37 65.38 90.2 
Washington 92.59 135.30 46.1 
West Virginia 25.28 38.04 50.5 
Wisconsin 31.75 70.04 121.7 
Wyoming 61.42 167.41 172.6 
Source: Hillhouse, 1936, Appendix A and Ornstein, et al., 1985, pp. 80-1. 
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2.6. Endnotes 
l.This chapter focuses on British investment in America· however the 
' ' 
importance of other foreign investment should not be discounted. 
2.This pledge, however, was not financially backed; that is, no system of 
taxation existed as a backup when the flow of revenue from various projects 
required to finance the debt failed to materialize. 
3.For a brief history of British debt practices between 1693-1800, see Szakaly 
(1992). 
4.It is not known whether or not this choice was a well-planned, conscious 
decision; that is, whether foreign investors understood that the higher interest 
rate reflected both inflationary expectations and risk of default. 
5.Restrictions on indebtedness were first included in Iowa's constitution in 
1846, but these limitations applied only to state debt, not municipal debt (Erbe 
1924, p. 370-371). 
6.This problem persists even today. Cities and counties compete to attract 
profitable businesses and attractions (e.g., promising a professional sports 
franchise a new stadium or facility to induce them to reside in a certain city, 
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county, or state). The competition in the private/public bond market became 
so fierce it induced the government in 1990 to place a volume cap on the use 
of public debt. 
7.We know today that even though a state may enact an amendment absolving 
itself of responsibility for debt incurred by nongovernment entities, it is not 
necessarily immune to retribution (e.g., lower credit ratings) from spurned 
parties (see Hackbart et. al 1990, p. 4). 
S.This fact allows us to conclude that either the amendments were well 
received by most citizens and legislatures or that the restrictions were not 
particularly binding (either because not much debt was issued or a means of 
circumventing the restrictions was available); thus, legislatures since the late 
19th century saw no need to amend them. 
9.The nine states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Minnesota's default 
problems differed from the other states because it was not controlled by a 
carpetbagger government and Americans, not Europeans, held all of the debt 
in default (McGrane 1935, p. 282). 
lO.A brief example of the compromise foreign investors reached with the state 
of Alabama shows the size of their financial loss. The total amount of old debt 
issued (not including overdue interest) should have amounted to $25.5M. In 
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an agreement with foreign bondholders, the state of Alabama agreed to 
acknowledge $12.6M, which would be repaid through issuing new debt. Part 
of the compromise included the following exchange: 
For the 7 percent gold bonds issued by the state in 1873 for 25 percent of the 
state's indorsement of railroad bonds, aggregating $1,192,000, it was proposed 
to issue new 30-year 5 percent currency bonds to the amount of$596,000. These 
bonds were called "Class B" bonds (McGrane 1935, p. 291). 
11.At this time, governments were not heavily supervised to ensure they were 
complying with all constitutional restrictions. Iowa's 1857 attempt at passing 
an amendment voiding all debt issued by the government above the 
constitutional limit provides evidence that such debt practices took place often 
enough to require an amendment preventing bondholders from seeking 
compensation. 
12.School district bonds remained in good credit standing throughout the 
Depression era defaults. They turned out to be one of the safest type of bonds 
with very few defaults on record (Hillhouse 1936, p. 21). 
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3 The Efficacy of State Constitutional Limitations 
on Borrowing 
3.0. Introduction 
Dismayed by the large deficits that the federal government has incurred over 
the past several years, many people in this country, including former president 
Ronald Reagan, advocate the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution 
requiring Congress to annually enact a balanced budget. At this time the 
so-called Balanced Budget Amendment has many hurdles to clear before it is 
ratified. At the state and local levels of government, on the other hand, voters 
and those who seek their votes have often been persuaded that it is desirable 
to constrain the range of budgetary outcomes from which democratically 
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elected representatives may choose. The longest running budgetary 
restrictions that confront state and local governments are limitations upon the 
amount and type of borrowing in which these governments may engage. 
Curiously enough, inquiries with state budget officials revealed these 
limitations have changed little since they were initially instituted, begging the 
question, how effective are these restrictions? 
As is well known, strictures against operating budget deficits are virtually 
universal at the state and local level. 1 But this hardly implies that these 
entities do no borrowing. Each year in the United States, thousands of state 
and local governments and public agencies acquire capital through the sale of 
long-term municipal bonds. The welfare economic justification for this sort of 
borrowing is straightforward: because the benefits derived from such 
undertakings stretch far into the future, there is a prima facie rationale for 
financing them with long-term debt (serviced either through future taxation 
or the revenue stream generated by the project) rather than out of current 
taxation (Moak 1982). 
State and local governments typically issue long-term debt as a series in which 
a certain percentage of bonds mature in successive years, with interest rates 
on each varying with the yield curve.2 Most corporate and all federal 
government bonds, in contrast, are term issues; instead of being paid off at 
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maturity, such debt is simply rolled over by issuing new bonds (Moak 1982). 
For investors, the key characteristics of state and local municipal bonds is that 
the interest they yield is tax-exempt and they are, for the most part, extremely 
safe.3 
Consequently, as shown in Figure 3.6.1, these bonds pay rates of interest that 
are lower than taxable corporate bonds of comparable quality and maturity. 
Their attractiveness varies, of course, with all major features of the tax code, 
including the structure of federal income tax rates, the tax treatment afforded 
to alternative investments, and whether or not the exemption also applies to 
state income taxes (see Poterba 1989). Thus we see in Figure 3.6.1 that the 
interest rate spread rose from less than 1.5 percent in the early 1960s to over 
4 percent in 1980, as inflation-induced bracket creep increased marginal 
income tax rates for large numbers of taxpayers. Several innovations in the 
tax code enacted during the first Reagan Administration, including dramatic 
reductions in federal income tax rates, the establishment of competing 
tax-sheltered investments such as IRA, Keough, and 401-k plans, and 
provisions permitting the leasing of tax shelters, subsequently narrowed the 
spread. The large volume of tax-exempt bonds that were issued in the early 
1980s might also have contributed to the decline in the interest rate 
differential. Many of the aforementioned tax provisions were eliminated in the 
1986 Tax Reform Act, and the interest differential has stabilized at around 2.5 
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percent. 
Figure 3.6.1 about here 
Largely in reaction to the defaults on state bonds in the nineteenth century 
(discussed in the previous chapter), and the highly undesirable consequences 
they engendered, many states in the previous century incorporated restrictions 
on the issuance of "full faith and credit" debt into their constitutions.4 What 
precisely is meant by "full faith and credit" is an unconditional pledge by the 
issuing government to levy whatever taxes are necessary to pay all interest 
and principal payments on a bond. Such debt may initially be backed up by 
specifically designated fees, taxes, or lease revenue, but in such cases the state 
acknowledges that it will step in to fund the debt if pledged sources are 
insufficient. These restrictions, taken from the information provided in 
Hackbart et al. (1990), included the following: (1) the limitation of full faith 
and credit debt to financing small casual deficits or for extraordinary purposes 
only; (2) a ceiling on the total amount of such debt; (3) a "flexible" ceiling that 
forbids debt to rise faster than some fraction of total revenue raised, property 
values, or some other revenue base; (4) the requirement that all debt issues be 
approved by a supermajority (either three-fifths or three-fourths) in the state 
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legislature; and (5) the requirement that the issuance of debt, or, alternatively, 
any debt in excess of the legal limit, be approved by the voters of the state in 
a referendum. 
Table 3.5.1 about here 
Table 3.5.1 reports the presence of each of these various restrictions in each of 
the 50 states. As shown here, a large majority of states have at least one type 
of constitutional limitation on full faith and credit debt (hereafter referred to 
as guaranteed debt), and some have as many as three. Most common is the 
requirement of voter approval for bond issues, stipulated in the constitutions 
of 25 states. Least common is the legislative supermajority requirement, and 
none of the six states that have adopted it have any other limitations in place. 
Twelve states make maximum guaranteed credit debt a function of available 
revenue, while fifteen others impose a dollar limit, typically less than a million 
dollars. This is obviously a trifling sum, but in the Nineteenth Century, when 
most of these constitutions were adopted, a million dollars was a more 
significant sum of money. There are only four states (Maryland, New 
Hampshire, Tennessee, and Vermont) in which bond issues can be authorized 
in the manner of regular legislation, i.e., with the approval ofthe governor and 
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state legislature. 
3.1. Institutional Constraints on Policy Outcomes 
To the extent there is a conventional wisdom concerning how efficacious such 
strictures are, it is probably that they are not. The requirement that bond 
issues be approved by the voters of the state in a referendum seems imposing 
enough; as Moak (1982) puts it, "The history of public debt in the United 
States at all levels tends to show that the electorate is financially more 
conservative than are its representatives in government" (p. 114). Perhaps, 
but most of the time bond issues appear to be relatively popular. Between 
June of 1982 and June of 1990, for example, voters in California approved 42 
of the 43 bond measures submitted to them. Similarly, the requirement that 
bond issues be approved by supermajorities in the state legislature may not be 
much of a hurdle, given the tendency for expenditure logrolls (and presumably 
borrowing logrolls as well) to approach universalistic proportions. It is also 
important to consider just what the absence of constitutional debt limitations 
imply. States may not have them because there historically has never been 
much demand, either on the part of the people or their elected representatives, 
to take on a great deal of debt. 
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The actual historical record, also, suggests that in this particular policy area 
majority rule is not easily thwarted, and that state governments can issue debt 
in the face of even the most stringent of constitutional limitations. As 
Hackbart et al. (1990) report, in order to issue debt, " ... states may simply 
change their constitutions periodically. For example, Texas is restricted to 
casual deficit borrowing, a $200,000 ceiling with no constitutionally detailed 
avenues for authorizing additional debt. In that situation, each state bond 
issue is authorized via constitutional amendment" (p. 3). 
Even if various constraints on issuing guaranteed debt are binding, it may well 
be that public officials can routinely circumvent them. Specifically, they can 
always adopt the simple expedient of issuing revenue bonds that are not 
guaranteed by the taxing power of the state. In general, state governments do 
not issue revenue bonds directly, but rather establish authorities, boards, 
agencies, districts, or commissions---what Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) refer 
to generically as "off-budget enterprises"---to do so. The traditional form of an 
off-budget enterprise is that of a "general operating authority," which issues 
bonds to construct public facilities such as power generation plants, roads, and 
airports. Revenues derived from the project or facility so funded, e.g., utility 
bills, tolls, or landing fees, are obligated to servicing the debt. In many 
instances, the bonds are also backed by a mortgage on the property or 
equipment involved (Moak 1982). 
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A second form of off-budget enterprise that issues nonguaranteed debt is 
known as the "lease-back" authority. These entities issue revenue bonds to 
invest in a wide variety of facilities such as schools, hospitals, and office 
buildings, which are then leased back to state and local governments that use 
tax revenues to pay the lease. Thirdly, nonguaranteed state debt also includes 
what the Census Bureau refers to as "public debt for private purposes," or 
what Moak ( 1982) calls "on behalf of' debt. The original manifestation of this 
sort of debt was the industrial revenue bond, but private purpose debt is now 
issued for housing developments, mortgage loans, shopping malls, student 
loans, sports facilities, pollution controls on privately owned facilities, and a 
wide gamut of other purposes. 5 Used more at the local level than at the state, 
this type of debt was drastically limited by the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 6 
Because taxpayers are not ultimately liable in the case of default, authorities 
issuing nonguaranteed revenue bonds are subject neither to constitutional or 
statutory debt ceilings nor to approval by the voters. They are, as Hackbart, 
et al. (1990) put it, "relatively free from oversight other than that exercised by 
their boards of directors" (p. 1). Not surprisingly, it is widely asserted that 
public officials resort to revenue bonds in general and lease-back arrangements 
in particular to circumvent constitutional and statutory limitations on full faith 
and credit debt. Describing the 1935 Pennsylvania Municipal Authorities Act 
that permitted the formation of off-budget enterprises with borrowing 
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authority, DiLorenzo and Bennett (1982) write that "local governments had 
found a way of insulating themselves from the immediate wishes of the voters 
and the intent of the state constitution's restrictions on local borrowing" (p. 
15). 
The downside of issuing nonguaranteed revenue bonds is that investors 
generally perceive them as riskier investments and thus demand a higher rate 
of interest (Moak 1982). Figure 3.6.2. reports annual yields for three different 
types of debt: guaranteed AAA-rated bonds, guaranteed Baa-rated bonds, and 
corporate debt (a proxy for nonguaranteed debt). The yield spread between the 
highest rated government bond and the lowest rated debt instrument varies 
from .2% to nearly 1.0%. Both forms of government debt, however, carry lower 
yields than corporate, nongovemment bonds. 
Figure 3.6.2 here 
The authority who issues bonds can, in principle, set lease payments or user 
fees at whatever level is required to service the debt, just as the state 
government itself may raise taxes to meet full faith and credit debt obligations. 
Such pricing flexibility is probably available where demand is fairly inelastic 
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and service provision is monopolistic, as in the case of water and electrical 
utilities. In other projects funded by revenue bonds, however, it may not be 
possible to garner more revenue by simply raising the rent or increasing user 
fees. Whatever the case, we would expect that public officials would generally 
prefer to issue guaranteed debt when they can in order to obtain funds at 
lower rates of interest. 
In the following sections of this chapter we assess the effectiveness of the 
various restrictions on borrowing, taxing, and spending that we have 
identified. Specifically, the analyses we undertake are intended to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Do constitutional restrictions on state full faith and credit debt actually 
constrain the amount of such debt that is issued? 
2. If so, to what extent are these restrictions circumvented by the issuance of 
nonguaranteed debt? 
3. Ifnot, is it because the limitations are not binding (i.e., the amount of debt 
issued is well below the limit)? 
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3.2. Constitutional Debt Limitations and State Bonded 
Indebtedness 
A good way to begin this empirical analysis is with a broad overview of the 
data on state bonded indebtedness. As shown in Table 3.5.2, which lists the 
amount of guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt outstanding for all 50 states in 
fiscal years 1962, 1971, 1981, and 1990, there is considerable variation in the 
amount and nature of the debt carried across states as well as across time 
(states are listed in order of the total amount of long-term debt they have 
outstanding). Many states eschewed full faith and credit debt. Four of 
them---South Dakota, Arizona, Nebraska, and Indiana---had no guaranteed 
debt at all throughout this period, a large number of others like Wyoming and 
Idaho never had more than trifling levels, and Iowa paid off the sole issue of 
guaranteed debt it ever took on. 
Table 3.5.2 about here 
In contrast, only Oregon and Alaska had no nonguaranteed debt outstanding 
at the beginning of our time period, and they and every other state eventually 
accumulated a good deal of it. By fiscal year 1990 only Kansas had less than 
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a hundred dollars ofnonguaranteed debt per capita, and fifteen states had over 
a thousand. The most striking figures in this table are probably those 
pertaining to Alaska, whose state financial structure, for not dissimilar 
reasons, bears much more resemblance to that of Saudi Arabia than to that of 
any other state in the Union. By 1980 real per capita state debt in Alaska was 
nearly three times greater than that of the next most debt-ridden state. In 
recent years state per capita debt in Alaska has fallen somewhat---not because 
much debt has been paid off, but rather because the population has been 
increasing so rapidly. In any event, we think that Alaska's debt structure is 
so unusual that it is best to exclude it from all subsequent analyses. 
Although Table 3.5.2 represents only an exploratory cut at these data, there 
is no obvious indication here that states systematically circumvent limitations 
on guaranteed debt by issuing nonguaranteed debt. There is no relationship 
between the two figures in fiscal year 1962, but by fiscal year 1981 the states 
with the most guaranteed debt seem to have relatively large amounts of 
nonguaranteed debt as well. To investigate this relationship a bit more deeply, 
we calculated the correlation (Pearson r) between the total level of real per 
capita guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt for every year in our series. The 
results, reported in Figure 3.6.3, display an interesting pattern. Although the 
two are virtually uncorrelated at the beginning of our series, the correlation 
rises dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s to a peak of. 73 in 1985. After 
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that the correlation drops off again considerably. Why did this occur? Our 
best conjecture is that the correlation between the two types of debt is 
particularly high during periods of strong demand for debt; during times when 
state governments are taking on large amounts of guaranteed debt, they and 
the off-budget entities they have created are also taking on large amounts of 
nonguaranteed debt. When demand is slack, in contrast, the amount of each 
type of debt outstanding is more reflective of institutional and other differences 
between states. If we detrend the series, looking only at the yearly change in 
debt issued (that is, debt level in year t minus debt level in year t-1), no 
definite relationship appears between guaranteed debt and nonguaranteed 
debt. Figure 3.6.4 shows that the relationship between the two types of debt 
is quite random, fluctuating greatly from one year to the next. We never 
observe the strong negative correlation predicted by the circumvention 
hypothesis. 
Figures 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 about here 
The data in Table 3.5.2 do suggest, though, that levels of guaranteed debt 
outstanding are associated with some of the constitutional limitations 
discussed previously. Of the thirteen states with negligible amounts (less than 
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$20 per capita) of guaranteed debt in fiscal year 1990, 9 required a referendum 
to approve such bonds, eight had a dollar limit (six had both of these features), 
and five restricted guaranteed debt to financing casual deficits or extraordinary 
expenses only. In contrast, of the twelve states that had accumulated $500 or 
more of guaranteed debt per capita at one time or another during this time 
period, only four required a referendum, only one had a dollar limit, and two 
of them had no limitations whatsoever. 
These relationships are borne out further in Table 3.5.3, which reports the 
average amount of real per capita guaranteed and nonguaranteed state debt 
outstanding during this time period in the states that have each of the various 
types of constitutional debt limitation. States which require a referendum and 
those which have specific dollar debt limits both carry lower than average 
amounts of full faith and credit debt, but the most effective limitation appears 
to be the blanket restriction on such debt save for financing casual deficits or 
extraordinary expenses only. The states with no constitutional limitations at 
all had much higher levels of guaranteed debt than average, but the highest 
totals of all are in the states which require the approval of a super-majority in 
their state legislature to issue such debt. As in Table 3.5.2, there is a positive 
association between levels of guaranteed debt and nonguaranteed debt, which 
is directly contrary to the circumvention hypothesis. 
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Table 3.5.3 about here 
Moreover, there is no evidence in Table 3.5.3 to suggest that effective limits on 
guaranteed debt lead to higher state general expenditures, or that these 
restrictions cause state governments to slough off either debt or expenditures 
to local governments. At both the state and local levels there is a relatively 
strong positive correlation (over .6 in most years) between amounts of 
outstanding debt and amounts of current expenditures. And, although the 
relationship is usually a modest one, local long-term debt and expenditure 
levels tend to be positively correlated with state debt and expenditure levels. 
Now here is there the negative correlation that would signify circumvention of 
limitations on full faith and credit debt by borrowing more or spending more 
somewhere else. 
The inferences we have made on the basis of the data in Tables 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 
remain tentative, of course, until we have taken into account other factors that 
have an important influence upon real per capita levels of state debt. A more 
rigorous examination of constitutional debt limitations thus requires a 
regression analysis in which other potential explanatory variables are 
specified. 
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Our regression analysis gets much of its foundation from the following reduced 
form equation (similar to that found in Matsusaka (1993)). It is not our intent 
to solve for a structural formula; we believe the reduced form equation for the 
stock of debt simply formalizes the relationships we wish to test. 
For each period t and each state i, the government sets the level of taxes T. 
' It' 
spending, Eit' and borrowing, Dit' so that 
(1) 
Fit is the level of federal revenues that state i receives in time period t. 
Government decision makers must weigh the benefits versus the costs of 
pursuing different goals; therefore, they maximize an objective function, 
U=U(Eit' Tit' Diu X;t, K;t, Fit), composed of the three endogenous policy variables 
mentioned above as well as three exogenous vectors, Fit' X;t and K;t. X;t 
contains socio-economic supply and demand variables that may shift the 
objective function. K;t is composed of dummy variables representing the 
constitutional limitations in each state over the time period. 
Solving the above maximization problem yields reduced form equations for Tit' 
Eio and Dit·7 We are concerned primarily with borrowing decisions; therefore, 




The coefficients for each variable are determined from the regression analysis, 
and the error term for each panel is assumed to be normally distributed. 
Applying the model towards our empirical analysis, we use i=1..49 (excluding 
Alaska) and t=1..30. We omit Alaska because, as stated earlier, it is an 
extreme outlier and may skew our results in one direction. We start our 
analysis in 1961 for several reasons. Initially, we wanted to include all fifty 
states in our analysis. Information on Hawaii and Alaska, however, was not 
recorded until the late 1950s. Moreover, we wanted to keep the definition of 
all the variables that we used the same across the entire period. Prior to 1960, 
many of the variables used in our analysis were specified differently; for 
example, before 1960, debt was defined by term length only, not type of debt 
and crime rate was not composed of the same felony crimes. For the sake of 
continuity, we began our analysis in 1961. 
Previous research on municipal bonds suggests what variables to include in ~t· 
Past work has indicated that an important influence upon how much debt a 
state can issue is the income of its residents (Holtz-Eakin 1991). Just as 
higher income households can qualify for larger mortgage loans, higher income 
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states can presumably carry higher levels of bonded indebtedness. We also 
reasoned that states with higher crime rates, which implies a greater need for 
police stations, courthouses, jails, and prisons, and states with greater 
numbers of children between the ages of five and seventeen, which signal 
increased educational and welfare demands, might need to issue more debt. 
In California, for example, as prisons have become more overcrowded and 
crime has increased, bond issues to build new facilities and repair existing ones 
have appeared frequently as propositions on election ballots. Thus, the initial 
control variables found in the vector, X;t, capture important supply and demand 
factors that may influence state bonded indebtedness--revenue supply (personal 
income), infrastructure demands (crime rate), and education needs (school age 
children). 
Upon further consideration, we included three additional supply variables in 
our vector X;t to test the influence of certain non socio-economic factors on the 
level of debt. State governments can slough off projects to local governments; 
therefore, this factor may influence the level of debt carried by state 
governments. We included local government expenditures and total debt in 
our analysis to see if higher levels oflocal spending or borrowing influences the 
level of state indebtedness. Moreover, to directly test for circumvention, we 
included full faith and credit debt as a right hand side variable to be included 
in tests of nonguaranteed debt. If circumvention plays any significant role in 
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state government borrowing practices, then we should observe the level of full 
faith and credit debt inversely affecting the level of nonguaranteed debt. 
In addition, as indicated previously in this paper, researchers have linked the 
volume of state and local bond issues to the amount of financial assistance 
state and local governments receive from the federal govemment. During the 
halcyon days ofrevenue sharing, states were able to fund much of their capital 
budget with state revenues while using federal dollars for general expenditure 
needs. Conversely, when the federal funds disappeared in the 1980s they could 
no longer build without borrowing because state revenues had to be used for 
general budgetary expenses (Government Finance Research Center 1983a). 
Hence, we included federal revenues, Fit• as an exogenous factor in our model. 
As political scientists we probably could not in good conscience fail to 
investigate the possibility that debt levels are sensitive to partisan politics; 
however, it is difficult to believe partisan politics behaves the same way at the 
state level of govemment as it does at the national level. First, it is not easy 
to relate party affiliation to borrowing practices. At the national level, it is 
often suggested that Democrats may be inclined to spend and borrow more 
than their Republican counterparts. The level of spending is not so easily 
attibuted to one party at the state level because evidence shows that 
Democrats spend more on welfare programs while Republicans spend more on 
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business projects (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Moreover, there is a great 
deal of variance between states on what it exactly means to be a Democrat or 
a Republican. Southern Democrats, for example, have long been classified 
separately in social science research because their conservative policy 
preferences place them closer to the national Republican party platform than 
their own. In many states there tends to be less distinction on policy issues 
based on partisanship than at the national level. Because the only realistic 
way to treat these distinctions would be on a state by state basis, we felt it 
would be better to leave such individual analysis for future research and 
concentrate our present efforts on aggregate effects. 
Though many states have more than one type of limitation, for this analysis 
we redefined the constitutional variables into mutually exclusive categories. 
After examining the policies followed by several states with multiple 
limitations, we noted that those states with a referendum restriction are not 
bound by other limitations because this amendment procedure nullifies all 
previous agreements. As noted earlier, if a state, such as Texas, has a dollar 
debt limit of $200,000, it can supersede this limit by passing a waiver 
amendment (via referendum) at the same time the bond issue is approved. 
Thus, we classified all states with a referendum restriction into this category 
only. Then, states with a dollar or a flexible debt limit, but not a referendum 
requirement, were placed in their own separate categories. The efficacy of the 
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dollar debt limit, in particular, needed to be tested because it was set so low 
(ranging from $0 to $2M). The variable controlling for the supermajority of the 
legislature requirement did not need further adjustment because it was 
already mutually exclusive. The new mutually exclusive categorization 
appears in Table 3.5.4. The constitutional limitation variables were also 
included in the institution vector, K;t· 
Regressing the level of debt on the limitation variables could prove problematic 
from a statistical point of view because the restrictions may be endogenous. 
By this we mean that the level of debt within a state may not be the result of 
restrictions imposed if the limitations are changed to reflect political or socio-
economic conditions in the state. Constitutional restrictions on borrowing may 
lower debt levels, but states with lower debt levels may impose limitations that 
reflect their conservative borrowing nature. Using the model specified above 
would be inappropriate because it assumes that the restrictions control debt 
levels, not that debt levels affect borrowing limits. The calculation would yield 
biased, inefficient results. 
We tested our data to see if using the limitation variables in the model 
specified above would lead to an endogeneity problem and thus require a 
correction such as the two-stage least squares approach. We contacted budget 
officers from different states, enquiring if the limitations on borrowing had 
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changed substantially within the last thirty years. Overall, the restrictions 
remained intact, with only a few minor changes to flexible debt limit 
percentages. Surprisingly, those states with low dollar debt limits (ranging 
from $0 to $2 million) had not changed these levels since they were 
incorporated, in most cases over a hundred years ago. Next, we tested if socio-
economic characteristics of the states affected the limitation. We used a latent 
variables approach, specifying a separate equation for each constitutional 
limitation variable, and regressing this value upon income, school age children, 
crime rate, and federal revenues. The logit analysis did not reveal any strong 
relationship between the debt restrictions and the socio-economic status ofthe 
states. We concluded that endogenous dummy variables did not pose a serious 
problem and that our model specification was appropriate. Other scholars 
conducting similar research have had similar results (Poterba 1993). 
In the following regression analyses, then, our dependent variables are annual 
figures of real per capita state guaranteed debt and real per capita state 
nonguaranteed debt. In addition to the dummy variables for each of the four 
mutually exclusive constitutional debt limitation provisions, the two debt 
variables are regressed upon: 
(1) Real Per Capita Personal Income. 
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(2) Crime rate. The well-known index, reported by the Justice Bureau, is the 
number of major felonies reported to the police per hundred thousand 
residents. 
(3) Percent Population Between Ages 5 through 17. The population figure is 
expressed as a percentage of the total residential population in a state. 
(4) Federal Assistance. It is expressed as the percentage of total state 
population as accounted for by aid from the federal government, including 
revenue sharing funds provided under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
Act of 1972. 
(5) (Exclusively used in the nonguaranteed equations) Real Per Capita Full 
Faith and Credit Debt. 
(6) (Exclusively used in the full faith and credit equations) Real Per Capita 
Local General Expenditures. 
(7) (Exclusively used in the full faith and credit equations) Real Per Capita 
Local Total Debt. 
Given the manner in which we have specified the variables in this regression 
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analysis, we would expect coefficients of the personal income, population, and 
crime rate variables to be positive, and the federal assistance term to be 
negative. To the extent any or all of the debt limitation provisions are effective 
in constraining full faith and credit debt, the signs of these terms in the first 
equation should be negative. To the extent these provisions are circumvented 
by the issuance of nonguaranteed debt, their signs in the second equation 
should be positive. 
Before reporting the methodology used to estimate the effect of the above 
variables on debt, we need to address the question ofwhether it is appropriate 
to focus on the stock or flow (i.e., year-to-year changes) of debt. Arguments 
have been made in favor of both as the most appropriate policy measure (Bahl 
and Duncombe 1993). Our analysis focuses on the stock of debt for several 
reasons. First, the socioeconomic variables we have chosen are also "stock" 
variables--they are all specified as a percent of the population for a specific 
year. The year to year changes in these variables are small; however, the long 
run (stock) changes are more significant. Moreover, the flow of debt, which 
concentrates on the net change in debt, is difficult to explain. We 
experimented with various policy lags but could not explain any significant 
variance in the flow of debt. The lack of results indicates that the policy lag 
structure in far more complicated than we specified. Year to year changes in 
debt levels depend crucially on economic and political conditions within each 
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state; thus, aggregating the data produces noisy results because of the various 
policy lag structures of each state. The stock method depends less on year to 
year changes because it is focusing more on long run trends. Because we wish 
to focus on such trends across states over a thirty year timespan, it is more 
appropriate in this analysis to estimate the stock of debt than the flow. 
We pooled the times series data together and ran an ordinary least squares 
regression, making the assumption that the intercept and slope remain 
constant. Because our data contain observations over a thirty year time 
period, serial correlation may affect our evaluation of the OLS regression 
results. Theory states that serial correlation produces inefficient standard 
errors and yields significance test results that are overly confident. This 
occurs when the errors are correlated overtime; for example, 
(3) 
Known as an AR(l) process, the error terms are composed of a random term, 
ut, and some percentage of the previous year's error term. The degree of 
correlation, p, ranges from zero to 1; zero implies that the standard errors are 
not correlated and one suggests the opposite. An AR(2) process is set up 
similarly except that the error term is correlated with the standard error of 
two periods ago, and likewise for higher AR(i) processes. 
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We examined the residuals after running a simple ordinary least squares 
regression. Graphing them over time for each state revealed that, indeed, 
serial correlation was present, but the degree varied greatly from state to 
state. Some states had fairly flat values while others showed typical evidence 
of a autocorrelation (e.g., Figure 3.6.5. shows the declining error terms over 
time for the state of New Hampshire). The residuals across states did not 
appear to share a common mean value; therefore, it was not necessary to 
correct for this factor along with the serial correlation. Following Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (1981), we calculated the correlation coefficient, p, for each state 
using the following formula: 8 
( 4) 
for i= 1. .49 and t= 1. .30 
While these values were close to 1 (ranging from .7 to .99), the difference 
between using a straight first differencing approach (i.e., p=1) and applying the 
p calculated above to a similar procedure proved significant enough to warrant 
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using the exact values. After completing the calculation for each state, a 
generalized differencing procedure was used. This statistical method removes 
the correlation from the equation according to the estimated degree of severity 
(which depends on the size of the coefficient calculated). We assumed that the 
errors were correlated according to an AR(1) process because we found no 
strong evidence to support the use of a higher process model. Thus, we 
estimated the following equation: 
( ~t - P;ait-1) + 13CX;t - P;X;t-1) + )'(F;t - P;F;t-1) + 
8(K;t - P;K;t-1) +(E;c P;E;t-1) 
for i=1..49 and t=1 .. 30 
(5) 
Results are reported in Table 3.5.5. We estimated five different regressions, 
beginning with the basic model specified above (using the initial X;t vector 
variables) in equation 1 and 2, and then we varied the exogenous variables for 
equations 3, 4, and 5. In equation 3, we include guaranteed debt as an 
independent variable. Local total debt and local total expenditures appear as 
right hand side variables in equations 4 and 5, respectively. Three equations 
(1, 4, and 5) used full faith and credit debt levels as the dependent variable 
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and two equations (2 and 3) regressed nonguaranteed debt upon the specified 
variables. The top entry is the regression coefficient, the bottom entry is the 
standard error. 
First of all, we see that the coefficients of the income term in all of the 
equations are statistically significant. It implies that a dollar increase in per 
capita income leads to a one cent increase in guaranteed debt and a three cent 
increase in per capita nonguaranteed debt. Guaranteed and nonguaranteed 
debt levels, however, are apparently not affected by federal assistance in any 
of the regressions. In addition, the coefficients on the crime rate are large and 
positive in all of the guaranteed debt equations, indicating that a rise in the 
rate of felony crimes lead to higher levels of guaranteed debt. The coefficients 
on the crime rate variable in the nonguaranteed debt equation, however, are 
large and negative, which is contrary to expectations. The population of 
schoolage children does not appear to have a strong affect on the level of debt 
a state holds. 
Table 3.5.5 about here 
As for the effects of constitutional debt limitations, we see that two of the 
terms---the limitation to funding debt under a specified dollar limit and the 
requirement of a referendum---are both very large and in the predicted 
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negative direction across all of the equations. Of course these results are what 
we anticipated on the basis of findings reported previously in Tables 3.5.2 and 
3.5.3. Also as before, neither the flexible debt ceiling provision nor the 
requirement of legislative supermajorities appeared to hold down debt levels. 
In fact, in all of the guaranteed and nonguaranteed equations, states with the 
supermajority limitation appear to issue higher levels of debt. Neither of the 
signs of the referendum or dollar debt limit limitation dummies are 
significantly positive in the nonguaranteed debt equation, as would be 
predicted by the circumvention hypothesis; quite the opposite, they are both 
strongly negative. 
Equations 4 and 5 also support earlier findings. The local government 
variables included in both of these equations do not significantly influence the 
levels of full faith and credit debt. This result gives more support to our initial 
conclusion that states do not pursue a strong policy of circumvention by 
sloughing off programs to the local governments for funding. That does not 
mean that state governments do not attempt to circumvent the borrowing 
limitations. Evidence from equation 3 shows that there is some substitution 
between full faith and credit and nonguaranteed debt, but the effect is almost 
negligible. State governments do not appear to actively pursue in any serious 
manner a policy of circumvention though the issuance of nonguaranteed debt. 
We conclude that certain constitutional provisions, namely the dollar debt 
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limitation and the requirement of a referendum, do lead to lower levels of real 
per capita full faith and credit debt. However, we are unable to find any 
strong evidence to support the contention that nonguaranteed debt is issued 
in order to circumvent restrictions on issuing guaranteed debt. 
Admittedly, the data contains features that may make the differencing model 
inappropriate. Specifically, there is a censoring problem; that is, the debt data 
are always greater than or equal to zero. Thus, the series is truncated at zero. 
We therefore estimated the relationship with both a covariance model and a 
tobit model (these models are better able to deal with the censoring problem). 
The covariance model allows time series data to be pooled together without 
restricting the intercept term to remain constant across states. Following 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), we specified the model using dummy variables 
for each state: 
(6) 
where for the ith state i= 2 .. 49 
0 otherwise 
Excluding one state for each type of limitation prevents perfect collinearity 
among the variables. The dummy variables measure the change in the 
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intercept term across states, explaining much of the error variation; however, 
they do not shed light on the source of variance. In addition, the model uses 
a significant number of degrees of freedom which may decrease its statistical 
power. We interpret these coefficients to be the average amount of real debt 
per capita held by a state over time. The states were grouped according to the 
mutually exclusive debt limit classification found in Table 3.5.4. While each 
limitation category has what might be termed "outlier" states (i.e., states with 
values that deviate significantly from other states), a definite trend emerges. 
The limitations do not appear to affect the levels of nonguaranteed debt held 
by the state, but states with a referendum requirement or dollar debt limit do 
hold lower levels of guaranteed debt (confirming our earlier results). This 
observation becomes apparant if we average the coefficient levels of real per 
capita debt across states within each debt limitation category (Table 3.5.6). 
Table 3.5.6 about here 
For guaranteed debt, the averages for referendum and dollar limit states, $200 
and $5, respectively, were noticeably lower than those states with a flexible 
debt limit ($387) or a supermajority of the legislature requirement ($468). The 
latter were both quite a bit higher than the average across all states ($265). 
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This distinction becomes less when we consider the nonguaranteed category. 
Three of the four types of limitations have higher values than the average of 
all the states, but the difference is not significant. We cannot make strong 
claims regarding the efficacy of the restrictions on the level on nonguaranteed 
debt. 
The tobit model, or Tobin's logit as it is sometimes referred to, is used when 
the data are truncated; that is, when the observations stop at a certain value. 
In our case, we have values for the amount of real debt a state holds that 
never become negative. Thus, we observe a dependent variable that is always 
greater than or equal to zero, but never less than zero. Ifwe run OLS using 
the above data, any test statistic used may be inaccurate because the expected 
value of our residuals do not equal zero (a necessary assumption when using 
OLS). To solve this problem, the tobit model uses a maximum likehood 
technique that combines a discrete and continuous nonlinear procedure to 
estimate the regression equation. We estimated the tobit model using the 
variables specified above for guaranteed debt only and compared the 
coefficients to those from the OLS Model. The results are reported in Table 
3.5.7. 
Table 3.5.7 about here 
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The coefficients across both types of estimation procedures are similar in 
magnitude and sign. The constitutional debt limitations in the tobit model are 
stronger than those from the OLS model, while the socioeconomic variables are 
greater in size and significance in the latter than the former. Thus, this 
additional analysis confirms our earlier conclusions. The tobit and covariance 
models both demonstrate that levels of full faith and credit debt are affected 
by the referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit, but not by the 
flexible debt or the supermajority of the legislature restriction. The 
socioeconomic variables raise the level of indebtedness in a state, while Federal 
Revenues, in these models, ease the borrowing pressures of the state. In both 
of these models, however, we found no evidence of circumvention. 
It would appear to us, then, that decisions about what type of debt to issue are 
driven primarily by factors other than the constitutional limitations we have 
investigated. According to Moak (1982), there are several compelling reasons 
for choosing to issue revenue bonds rather than full faith and credit debt, and 
why it is a good idea to segregate "self-supporting" debt from tax-supported 
debt. First, there are some important political advantages in issuing 
nonguaranteed revenue bonds. Debt financed by revenue means that it is the 
users who pay for a project rather than the taxpayers, and a large share of 
users are often nonresidents. 
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Secondly it is often easier to raise fees than to raise taxes: "When the 
enterprise is separately funded and this is fully demonstrated by the 
accounting system, the governing body may find it more appropriate to 
maintain charges at an appropriate level---even in the face of 
opposition---because it is necessary to meet contractual obligations relating to 
the enterprise debt"(p. 112). Perhaps most importantly, however, issuing 
guaranteed debt for a project that could readily be funded with revenue bonds 
"dilutes the pledge;" a state or municipality that becomes overly reliant on 
guaranteed debt can raise enough concern among the ratings agencies that the 
sought-after interest rate advantage disappears. 
Also, the federal government may affect debt issuance by the policies it enacts. 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act forced states to limit the amount of tax-exempt debt 
issued to the greater of $150 million or $50 per capita. In addition, in 1990, 
the federal government placed a cap that limits the volume of bonds that may 
be issued when the public benefits significantly. State officials responded by 
establishing commissions to deal with the distribution of tax-exempt rights to 
state and local issuers. While this response has helped states organize under 
the new rules, it has not loosened the existing tight grip on state borrowing 
abilities. 
Finally, there is some evidence that "neighborhood effects" may have 
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influenced some states to hold less guaranteed debt. Beginning in the late 
1970s, guaranteed debt declined, most rapidly from fiscal year 1976 through 
1980. It should be noted that in 1975, New York City suffered a severe fiscal 
cns1s that nearly caused a collapse in the financial structure of the 
government. The near catastrophe was brought on by poor financial practices. 
To finance much of its municipal activities, New York City officials issued a 
great deal of guaranteed debt, and they floated even more bonds to cover this 
debt when the notes came due. As Shefter (1985) notes, "Once these 
unorthodox financial practices became general knowledge, the capital markets 
closed to the city." (p. xxi) New York City officials, no longer able to rely on 
full faith and credit debt, turned to nonguaranteed debt as a new source for 
financing municipal activities. It is quite possible that the near collapse of 
New York's government from poor financial practices and its subsequent 
restructuring through nonguaranteed sources affected the financial 
communities of surrounding states. If we examine the changes from 1977-80 
in the level of guaranteed debt held by states, eight of the nine states with the 
greatest decline in full faith and credit debt (i.e., over $100 per capita) were 
New England (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and Vermont) and Mid-Atlantic (Pennsylvania and Maryland) states. It is 
unlikely that these events are entirely coincidental, and several financial 
officials from the above state governments and inventment houses agree that 
the New York Crisis did influence financial practices in many states, perhaps 
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simply by demonstrating the vulnerability of financing bonds by state revenues 
alone. Neighborhood effects, thus, may account for some of the dramatic 
decline in the level of full faith and credit debt held by states in the late 1970s. 
3.3. Some Debt Limitations Revisited 
In the above analysis, the dollar debt limit appears to have constrained the 
level of debt but the flexible debt limit significantly did not. Is the dollar debt 
limitation much more effective than the flexible debt restriction? Are the 
restrictions set so high so as not to be binding? Or do states exceed them 
directly via referendum, legislative majority vote, etcetera? We consider each 
of these questions in turn, first for the dollar debt limit and then for the 
flexible debt limit. 
3.3.1. The Dollar Debt Limit 
Sixteen states have a debt limit tied to a dollar amount (though, in the 
regression analysis, we only had 4 because the remaining 12 also have other 
constitution restrictions). By today's standards, the amount is very low, 
varying from $50K in Oregon and Rhode Island to $2 million in Maine and 
Idaho. Adopted into most constitutions over one hundred years ago, these 
limits were meant to be binding at the time they were adopted (i.e., the dollar 
value of these constraints was deliberately set low). Many state legislators (in 
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particular, those from the Democratic party) hoped this action would restore 
their state's credit worthiness which was severely damaged by a great number 
of large state and local defaults in the 1840s. They hoped that the legislation 
would prevent such defaults from occurring again. 
While provisions were not included in the original legislation to accommodate 
future variations in the dollar's value, many state constitutions allow the limit 
to be temporarily exceeded. Of the fifteen states that have a dollar debt limit, 
twelve require a referendum to exceed the constraint and two require a 
declaration of emergency by the governor followed by a two-thirds vote of the 
house. Alabama does not allow debt over the limit for any reason. 
To analyze the "bindingness" of this constraint, the total amount of full faith 
and credit debt was subtracted from the dollar debt limit for each year between 
1961-1990.9 Each state was then evaluated by the following criteria: (1) did 
the total level of full faith and credit debt exceed the dollar debt in any of the 
years, and if so, by what percentage, and (2) if the debt level did not exceed the 
limit, was the limit constraining or was no debt issued? Table 3.5.8 lists each 
state, the size of the dollar debt limit, and the results of our evaluation. 
Table 3.5.8 about here 
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In only one case was the constraint tested and it actually restricted the debt 
level. From 1961-1986, the state ofldaho maintained levels of guaranteed debt 
that ranged from a low of lOOK to a high of two million, but it never exceeded 
the two million dollar ceiling. 
Table 3.5.8 shows that the remaining states fall into two categories. Eight 
states repeatedly exceed the constraint by margins greater than 30% of the 
debt limit. Out of this group, three have the additional requirement of 
allowing only casual deficits or extraordinary expenses only while the other 
five require a referendum to issue debt or exceed the limit. The other seven 
states have at some point accumulated levels of debt in excess of their limit, 
but no longer actively issue full faith and credit debt; thus, by the mid-1980s, 
most of these states retired all of their guaranteed debt. Out of these states, 
five are restricted to issuing debt for casual deficits or extraordinary expenses 
only, the remaining two require a referendum to issue debt. 
What does this tell us about the efficacy of a dollar debt limit constraint? 
Perhaps a dollar debt limit is not as effective as we first believed. True, in our 
regression analysis, the dollar limit appeared to constrain the level of debt, but 
if we include states that have other limitations (like the referendum 
restriction), eight out of the sixteen states exceed the limit specified. On the 
other hand, half no longer even issue full faith and credit debt (among them 
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are most of the states that have a dollar debt limit only), perhaps a sign that 
the state was constrained by the limitation and no longer found it feasible to 
issue guaranteed debt. 
One possible reason why the dollar debt limit is less effective in some states 
than in others is the power of other constraints. As mentioned above, in the 
states where guaranteed debt is no longer issued, five out of seven also are 
restricted to casual deficits and extraordinary expenses only. Those states that 
exceed the dollar debt limit consistently also have a referendum requirement. 
Perhaps the answer to "Is the dollar limit as effective as first thought" relies 
upon whether a device exists to readily override it (as the referendum 
requirement appears to do). 
3.3.2. The Flexible Debt Limit 
Twelve states have a constitutional limit that forbids the total level of 
guaranteed debt to rise faster than a percentage of state revenues, 
appropriations, or assessed property values. Out of these states, eight have no 
other restrictions, three have a referendum requirement and one limits debt 
to casual deficits or extraordinary expenses only. 
Our empirical analysis focused on the six states that limit debt levels to a 
percentage of general revenue or appropriations. We have not been able to 
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obtain information from the other six states that have restrictions base on 
assessed property values; therefore, we cannot judge the effectiveness of 
flexible limits in these states. To test the bindingness of the restriction using 
the data already gathered, we calculated the difference between the limit and 
the actual level of guaranteed debt. We evaluated the results using the same 
guidelines reported in the previous subsection. The results are reported below 
in Table 3.5.9. 
Table 3.5.9 about here 
Once again, the results fall into two categories. Connecticut and Mississippi 
have generous limits, so much so that their levels of guaranteed debt have 
never come within one billion dollars of the constraint. For example, in 1980 
the "gap"--the difference between the flexible debt limit and the level of full 
faith and credit debt--for Connecticut was $5.5 billion and for Mississippi $3.0 
billion. By 1990, these numbers grew to $17.3 billion and $6.2 billion, 
respectively. 
In contrast, Georgia, South Carolina, and New Jersey surpassed their flexible 
debt limits. Georgia (from 1961-1987) and South Carolina (from 1980-1990) 
exceeded their constraints by approximately 10% of total revenues; New 
Jersey's limit was overrun by margins significantly larger that 10%.10 Hawaii 
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falls somewhere between these states and Connecticut and Mississippi. Its 
flexible debt limit appears to be binding from 1961-1985. During this period 
the gap is 1% or less of total revenues (e.g., in 1985, the gap was 
approximately $71 million, compared to 2.2 billion in state total revenues). 
These results expand our prevwus conclusions. While we knew that the 
flexible debt limit did not significantly constrain the levels of full faith and 
credit debt, the reason why this is true is not entirely clear. Evidence shows 
that some states avoid binding limitations by setting high ceilings. Moreover, 
as in the case of the dollar debt limits, several states exceed the constraint by 
significant amounts (over 10% of general revenues in New Jersey's case). 
Some states have clauses in their constitution that allows them to exceed their 
limit for emergency purposes or, for example, one fiscal year provided that they 
balance their budget in the subsequent year. 
3.4. Conclusions 
State and local governments have long had constitutional limits on the 
issuance of full faith and credit debt. Our analyses find that levels of such 
debt depend upon the type of restriction in place. States that require voter 
approval for new guaranteed debt or a fixed dollar debt had lower average debt 
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totals than those that required a supermajority of the legislature to issue debt. 
Limitations tied to income or revenue growth appeared at first to be largely 
ineffectual, but after further analysis, it was noted that half of the states with 
this restriction either issued no debt or debt levels well below their limits. The 
remaining states exceeded their limits through legislative channels (e.g., 
approved amendments to the constitution). We speculate that certain 
combinations oflimitations (e.g., referendum and dollar debt limit) allow states 
to achieve one of these outcomes more easily than the other. 
Moreover, states do not systematically circumvent these limitations, either by 
issuing non-guaranteed debt, increasing general expenditures, or sloughing off 
programs and responsibilities to local governments. For most of the series the 
correlation between guaranteed debt and nonguaranteed debt was slight, and 
when it did became fairly strong in the mid-1980s, the correlation remained 
positive--the more non-guaranteed debt issued, the more guaranteed debt 
issued. Outstanding debt and general expenditures were also positively 
correlated. 
While most previous research on the circumvention hypothesis has focused on 
the surge in nonguaranteed debt that began in the late 1970s, we believe the 
more interesting fact to note is the decline in guaranteed debt. If the level of 
guaranteed debt continued at the rate of growth in the mid-1970s, the gap 
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between the two types of debt would not have been so large; however, it did 
not. Moak (1982) and investment specialists at Moody's believe that the 
decline in the levels of full faith and credit debt that began in the late 1970s 
was caused by a shrinkage in the interest rate gap between the guaranteed 
and nonguaranteed debt. Many believe the question of circumvention could be 
answered by measuring this gap. At this point in time, this measurement is 
not only impossible but undesirable. A general bond yield for nonguaranteed 
debt is not available simply because it varies so much in its payment structure 
and riskiness from state to state. To compile such a series would be quite 
daunting, as evidenced by the fact that no one has yet compiled such a series. 11 
Such a comparison, though, suffers from statistical problems. The interest rate 
on both types of bonds is a factor not only of the demand and risk involved but 
also the supply of debt. Because the yield on bonds is endogenous to the 
amount outstanding, it makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about cause 
and effect. Any conclusions drawn by measuring a differential would be 
flawed. 
Our findings provide some answers but also raise new questions. The most 
important of these new questions is why certain constitutional debt limitations 
are effective in restricting the issuance of full faith and credit debt. There is, 
after all, no shortage of reasons why these provisions or any other institutional 
arrangements should not place any real constraints on policy choices. In 
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particular, if states which are constitutionally proscribed from issuing debt can 
simply bundle a bond issue referendum measure with a waiver for the 
offending provision, why should it be more difficult for them to issue debt than 
other states similarly burdened by their constitutions? One possible future 
avenue worth exploring involves determining whether states with certain 
constitutional limitations also put additional obstacles in the way of officials 




Table 3.5.1. State Constitutional Limits on Full Faith and Credit Borrowing 
state Referendum Super- Extra- Dollar Flexible 
Required majority ordinary Debt Debt 
Required Only Limit Limit 
Alabama x 
Alaska X 
Arizona X X 
Arkansas X 
California X 






Idaho X X 
Illinois X 
Indiana X 
Iowa X X X 
Kansas X X 
Kentucky X X X 
Louisiana X 





Mississippi X X 
Missouri X X X 
Montana X 
Nebraska X X 
Nevada X 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey X X 
New Mexico X 
New York X 
North Carolina X X 
North Dakota X X 
Ohio X X X 
Oklahoma X 
Oregon X X 
Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island X X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X 
Tennessee 





West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Wyoming X X 
Source: Hackbart, et al., Debt and Duty 
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Table 3.5.2. State Long Term Real Debt Per Capita (in dollars) 
1961 1971 
State FFC NG State FFC NG 
I a o 9 27 Missouri 17 59 
S. Dakota 0 48 Iowa 7 87 
Arizona 0 51 Nebraska 0 118 
Nevada 27 24 Arizona 0 122 
Nebraska 0 52 Idaho 7 123 
Iowa 44 22 S. Dakota 0 132 
Missouri 53 24 Colorado 0 132 
Utah 0 80 Arkansas 7 135 
N. Dakota 34 57 N. Dakota 0 159 
Wisconsin 0 110 Virginia 40 144 
Colorado 0 134 Nevada 121 91 
Tennessee 133 10 Utah 104 133 
Wyonming 0 152 Kansas 0 240 
Texas 92 74 Indiana 0 249 
Virginia 7 189 N. Carolina 201 49 
Arkansas 125 78 Texas 123 139 
N. Carolina 198 13 Michigan 57 228 
Minnesota 199 29 Tennessee 197 95 
New Mexico 76 170 New Mexico 57 270 
Alaska 271 0 Ohio 112 226 
Montana 25 269 Wyoming 0 343 
Florida 0 301 Montana 1 349 
Alabama 61 266 Illinois 75 279 
Illinois 120 214 Florida 0 368 
Ohio 58 287 S. Carolina 240 130 
Indiana 0 354 Wisconsin 156 222 
Kansas 33 323 Minnesota 332 49 
Mississippi 190 186 Georgia 0 499 
S. Carolina 310 98 New Hampshire 517 10 
Georgia 0 414 Mississippi 355 190 
Louisiana 328 120 Alabama 76 475 
Michigan 60 395 Maine 473 148 
Rhode Island 443 30 Washington 83 542 
Pennsylvania 98 396 Louisiana 346 291 
Oklahoma 111 406 New Jersey 333 328 
Vermont 506 22 California 621 85 
Maine 206 326 Oklahoma 182 546 
New Jersey 297 263 Pennsylvania 284 506 
New Hampshire 558 9 Maryland 454 340 
W. Virginia 240 360 Massachusetts 539 270 
Washington 74 565 Rhode Island 650 203 
California 608 43 W. Virginia 406 481 
Kentucky 142 542 New York 345 547 
New York 350 349 Oregon 977 0 
Oregon 799 0 Kentucky 316 821 
Maryland 318 547 Connecticut 1197 256 
Massachusetts 682 409 Vermont 1131 464 
Hawaii 681 505 Delaware 1502 429 
Connecticut 763 511 Hawaii 1384 715 
Delaware 1599 125 Alaska 1578 851 
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Table 3.5.2. State Long Term Real Debt Per Capita (in dollars) 
1981 1990 
State FFC NG State FFC NG 
zona 0 57 nsas 0 88 
Iowa 0 168 Texas 135 176 
Nebraska 0 175 N. Carolina 63 275 
Indiana 0 189 Georgia 228 123 
Kansas 13 185 Tennessee 92 276 
Texas 69 139 Mississippi 162 209 
Arkansas 0 230 Iowa 0 404 
N. Carolina 145 107 Arizona 0 446 
Colorado 0 271 Arkansas 9 517 
Georgia 108 173 Colorado 11 518 
Missouri 18 284 Indiana 0 534 
Florida 136 186 Florida 100 468 
Tennessee 163 183 Nebraska 361 240 
Mississippi 326 23 Minnesota 250 376 
N. Dakota 17 333 Pennsylvania 275 360 
Alabama 34 325 Idaho 0 697 
Virginia 48 353 Alabama 193 506 
Michigan 81 335 Michigan 56 660 
California 291 126 California 135 583 
Montana 9 420 Virginia 53 669 
Utah 67 373 Missouri 112 618 
Idaho 1 446 Ohio 180 559 
Ohio 244 237 Utah 110 644 
Washington 380 103 S. Carolina 166 636 
Pennsylvania 366 209 Oklahoma 8 826 
Wisconsin 407 181 New Mexico 57 807 
Oklahoma 62 574 Washington 540 325 
New Mexico 20 627 Wisconsin 343 567 
Minnesota 251 397 Illinois 255 693 
Illinois 280 378 N. Dakota 0 952 
Nevada 145 627 W. Virginia 183 780 
Maine 258 567 Nevada 445 578 
S. Carolina 180 650 Maryland 308 716 
Kentucky 80 840 Kentucky 14 1014 
Louisiana 639 285 Montana 70 1174 
Maryland 585 427 Maine 181 1077 
W. Virginia 529 521 Wyoming 1 1428 
Wyoming 0 1067 Vermont 343 1264 
S. Dakota 0 1116 Oregon 1447 210 
Massachusetts 643 477 New Jersey 277 1492 
New Jersey 288 857 S. Dakota 0 1809 
New Hampshire 399 813 New York 207 1657 
Vermont 593 857 Louisiana 612 1470 
New York 256 1298 Hawaii 1318 862 
Connecticut 829 742 New Hampshire 377 1806 
Delaware 764 1192 Massachusetts 955 1278 
Rhode Island 266 1736 Connecticut 978 1451 
Hawaii 1536 565 Rhode Island 329 2240 
Oregon 2326 169 Delaware 507 2682 
Alaska 1941 4706 Alaska 904 6692 
Sources: Governmental Finances and The Statistical Abstract of the US 
117 
Table 3.5.3. State Constitutional Debt Limitations and Average Levels of Per Capita Debt 
and Expenditures (in 1982 dollars) 
Type of FFC NG General Local Local 
Limitation Exp. LT Debt Exp. 
Extraordinary 
Expenses Only 115 294 675 1183 922 
Supermajority 
of Legislature 468 540 888 1186 1081 
Referendum 
Requirement 193 408 774 1135 1055 
Flexible Debt 
Limit 328 427 877 1008 1012 
Dollar Debt 
Limit 201 327 753 1151 1000 
No Debt 
Limit 436 447 838 929 904 
Average of 
All States 
. 271 411 805 1126 1010 
"Except for Alaska 
Sources: Hackbart, et al., D!i:bt and Duty, Government Finances In the U.S.,~ 
Gov!i,lrnmgnt Fin!m~g§ 
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Table 3.5.4. State Constitutional Limits on Full Faith and Credit Borrowing (Mutually 
Exclusive Categorization) 
state Referendum Supennajority 
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Table 3.5.5. The Effects of State Constitutional Debt Limitations 
Dependent Variable 
(Real Per Capita Debt) 
Constant 
Full Faith & Credit Debt 
Real Per Capita Personal 
Income 
Federal Assistance 
Percent of Population 




Dollar Debt Limit 
Flexible Debt Limit 
Rz 
n 








































































Table 3.5.5. The Effects of State Constitutional Debt Limitations 
(continued) 
Dependent Variable 
(Real Per Capita Debt) 
Constant 
Real Per Capita Local 
Total Debt 
Real Per Capita Local 
Total Expenditures 
Real Per Capita Personal 
Income 
Federal Assistance 
Percent of Population 




Dollar Debt Limit 
Flexible Debt Limit 
R2 
n 




















































Table 3.5.6 Covariance Model Average Real Per Capita Dollars by Type of 
Debt and Limitation 
Guaranteed Debt Nonguaranteed Debt 
Referendum 200 402 
Required 
Dollar Debt 5 256 
Limit 
Flexible Debt 387 403 
Limit 
Supermajority 468 539 
of Legislature 
Required 
Average of 265 400 
All States 
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Real Per Capita Personal 
Income 
Federal Assistance 
Percent of Population 




Dollar Debt Limit 
Flexible Debt Limit 
Sigma2 














































































































1987 (no debt 
after) 
over limit, 
no debt 1977-90 
no debt 
lln0-79, 1.005-90 
no debt 1971-90 
over limit 
over limit 
no debt issued 






Table 3.5.9. The "Bindingness" of the Flexible Debt Limit 
State Flexible Limit Binding? Reason 
Connecticut 4.5x total tax N limit 2x 
receipt of prev. year higher than ffc 
debt 
Georgia not to exceed N over limit 
10% of total rev. by approx. 
less refunds of prev. year 10% of rev. 
Hawaii principal+int. pymts. y gap<l% of 
not to exceed 18.5% of rev. 
3 year prior avg. of rev. 
Mississippi Less than 1.5x rev. in N limit 10% 
any four preceding years higher than 
ffc debt 
Nevada Less than 1% of assessed 
value of all property by 
preceding assessment 
New Jersey 1% of total annual N over by 10% 
appropriations of rev. 
North 2/3 by which states 
Carolina outstanding debt is 
retired in previous 
biennium 
South Less than 5% prior N over by 10% 
Carolina years general fund rev. of rev. 
South Less than 1% of assessed 
Dakota value of all property by 
preceding assessment 
Utah Less than 1% of assessed 
value of all property by 
preceding assessment 
Wisconsin Less than 1% of assessed 
value of all property by 
preceding assessment 
Wyoming Less than 1% of assessed 
value of all property by 
preceding assessment 
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Figure 3.6.2 







Guaranteed vs. Corporate Debt 
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Figure 3.6.3 
Yearly Correlation Between State 
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Figure 3.6.5 
FFC Regression Residuals 
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1. There is enough variation in state balanced budget requirements, however, 
to warrant systematic analysis (Alt and Lowry 1992). In particular, states vary 
in the extent to which budget deficits and surpluses can be carried over from 
one fiscal year to another. 
2. With so many different entities selling so many different bonds, it is simply 
not feasible to have a central market or clearinghouse for municipal bonds, as 
there is for common stocks. Bond issues are thus typically underwritten by a 
syndicate of major investment banks. 
3. Municipal bonds have traditionally been the cornerstone of a conservative, 
low-return but low-risk investment portfolio. Moak (1982) describes their 
appeal in the following way: "Money is generally timid; old money is more 
timid; and old money being invested by fiduciaries is excessively timid" (p. 77). 
Interestingly, financial analyses often find that yields on tax-exempt municipal 
bonds (in particular, those with long maturities) are anomalously high 
compared to comparable taxable bonds (Kochin and Parks 1988; Green 1992). 
4. See the section 2 for a detailed description of the defaults and resulting 
restrictions. 
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5. Riker's (1980) actual words are as follows: "In the end, therefore, 
institutions are no more than rules and rules are themselves the product of 
social decisions ... One can expect that losers on a series of decisions under a 
particular set of rules will attempt (often successfully) to change institutions 
and hence the kind of decisions produced under them. In that sense rules or 
institutions are just more alternatives in the policy space and the status quo 
of one set of rules can be supplanted with another set of rules" (p. 445.) 
6. A major type of "on behalf of" debt instrument issued by municipalities in 
California during the past decade is the celebrated Mello-Roos bond authorized 
by 1982 legislation of the same name. Under this program a municipality 
allows real estate developers to issue bonds under its name, with the proceeds 
used for roads, sewers, utility hookups, schools, and other infrastructure in a 
housing development. The bonds are then financed out of the taxes paid by 
the incoming residents. In the meantime, the developer, not the city, is 
responsible for debt service on the bonds. Over $20 billion of Mello-Roos bonds 
were issued, but less than $4 billion are currently outstanding (Petruno 1992). 
7. Our model differs somewhat from Matsusaka's. We include the level of 
borrowing as one of the choices made by the government. Matsusaka's model 
has net borrowing "completely determined once spending and taxes are chosen" 
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(p. 5). We disagree with this aspect of his model. Borrowing is as much a 
choice variable as spending and taxing, influenced by similar socio-economic 
and institutional factors. It is not automatically determined once the level of 
the latter two have been chosen. 
8. We did not observe any severe heteroscedasticity problem; therefore, we 
corrected only for serial correlation in the panels. 
9. We want to measure how much of a constraining affect the limitations have 
on the total amount of revenues or expenditures. Of course, this method is a 
fairly simplistic way of analyzing a complicated problem, and we acknowledge 
that the results are rough estimates. 
10. From 1983-1990, the total amount of guaranteed debt outstanding in New 
Jersey exceeded the flexible debt limit approximately ten times over. We were 
not able calculate the gap for earlier years because New Jersey's Office of 
Management and Budget was not able to provide figures on total 
appropriations. 
11. Moody's as well as other investment services have listings of individual 
revenue bonds from state to state, but do not have an aggregate series across 
states simply because of the complications involved in generating such a series. 
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3.8. Data Sources 
[1] Debt, Revenue, and Expenditure: Governmental Finances and State 
Finances. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, various years. 
[2] Crime rates, interest rates, and per capita personal income: Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, various years. 
[3] State Governors and Legislatures: The Book of States. The Council of 
State Governments, 1960-1990. 
[4] Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: Hackbart et. al., "Debt and 
Duty." The Council of State Governments, 1990. 
[5] Revenue and Expenditure Limitations: Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism, 1992. American Council on Intergovernmental Relations. 
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4 The Tax Revolt Era Limitations on Borrowing 
and Spending 
4.0. Introduction 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the expansion of the welfare state in the U.S. 
was smoothed by sustained economic growth. Many of the programs 
established were funded by state tax revenues. The costs associated with such 
public policy increased dramatically in the 1970s because the private economy's 
growth slowed (Sears and Citrin, p. 225). Between 1970 and 1977, the total 
level of public spending increased while real disposable income declined. 1 This 
factor, combined with the rapid growth in the size of state and local 
governments, an increased property tax burden, the development of budget 
surpluses in many states, and the spread of general mistrust about officials 
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and institutions, spawned the grass roots movement that became known as the 
Tax Revolt. 
There are no distinct patterns that explain why taxing and spending 
limitations were approved in some states but not in others. Tax Revolt 
legislation succeeded in states where government spending and taxation was 
high, but it also was defeated in such states. Moreover, citizens in low tax 
states such as Texas and Idaho passed quite restrictive measures. Several 
researchers, in particular Wilensky (1976) and Sears and Citrin (1985), have 
argued that the Tax Revolt was caused not so much by the total level of taxes 
assessed but by a rapid rise in the tax burden. This reasoning would explain 
the almost militant revolt in California and Massachusetts, resulting in the 
passage of Proposition 13 and Proposition 2 1/2, respectively. 
While the reasons for adopting certain limitations may remain somewhat 
unclear, the effects of these constraints, according to several researchers, are 
quite apparent (Petruno 1992). In addition to the direct constraints on 
revenues and expenditures, the tax revolt limitations (summarized in Table 
4.5.1 below) also affected the levels of long term indebtedness in those states 
with constraints. Petruno attributes the dramatic rise in state nonguaranteed 
debt levels in the late 1970s to attempts by legislators to circumvent the tax 
revolt limitations on taxing and spending. 
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Table 4.5.1 about here 
Figures 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 demonstrate the significant increase in debt. Figure 
4.6.1 illustrates the total amount of outstanding long-term debt of state 
governments from fiscal year 1961 through fiscal year 1990. Figure 4.6.2 
displays the same data expressed in per capita, constant (1982) dollar terms. 
A comparison of the two shows that although the nominal level of guaranteed 
debt rose steadily during the period from 1961-1990, it actually started falling 
in real per capita terms in fiscal year 1977, and is no higher today than at the 
beginning of our series. There was also little growth in real per capita 
nonguaranteed debt in the first part of the series, and these trends were 
mirrored at the local level. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s there were a series 
of alarming reports concerning the lack of investment in infrastructure and its 
resultant deterioration (see Government Finance Research Center 1983b, and 
especially Choate and Walter 1981).2 In the 1980s, however, nonguaranteed 
debt outstanding followed a very different trajectory. Prior to the mid-1970s 
there was actually more guaranteed state debt outstanding than 
nonguaranteed debt, but after 1975, the amount of nonguaranteed debt grew 
dramatically. By the end of the decade state nonguaranteed debt totaled over 
$700 per capita (in 1982 dollars), compared to only a little over $200 in 
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guaranteed debt. 3 
Figures 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 about here 
It should be noted, however, that the amount oflong-term debt outstanding is 
not an entirely accurate picture of state credit liabilities. On the plus side, 
governments and other public authorities typically have large amounts of 
offsetting balances on hand (Moak 1982). On the negative side, there are 
several ways to hide long-term debt. It can, for example, be disguised as 
short-term debt, typically in the form of tax, revenue, and bond anticipation 
notes with maturities of one year or less. Such vehicles are often used to 
expedite construction on approved projects or to avoid selling long-term debt 
when interest rates are unfavorable. If such debt is routinely rolled over from 
year to year, however, it obviously provides a long-term source of capital (Moak 
1982). This practice is very problematic, of course, when "anticipated" 
revenues fail to materialize, as in the case of New York City in 1975. These 
figures also do not include Certificates of Participation, which Petruno (1992) 
describes as a popular "debt end-run." In a bond issue, the borrower pledges 
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new tax money to fund interest payments. With certificates of participation, 
no new taxes are earmarked and the payments come directly out of the annual 
budget. Both Moak and Petruno assert that these schemes are used routinely 
to sidestep voter approval and other restrictions on long-term debt. 
Nonetheless, there Is no mistaking the dramatic increase in state 
nonguaranteed debt that has occurred over the past fifteen years or so. 
Petruno (1992) asserts explicitly that much of the borrowing by public 
authorities in California over the past decade "has been designed to circumvent 
the tax limitations imposed by Proposition 13 in 1978" (p. D5). Analysts at the 
Government Finance Research Center (1983a) present a somewhat more 
complicated scenario. Their figures indicate that during the 1970s, state and 
local government became increasingly reliant upon federal monies for funding 
their capital needs. When federal assistance subsequently dried up, however, 
they ran into revenue and expenditure limitations that had been enacted and 
had no where else to go but to the credit markets (p. 45). The presence of 
constitutional restrictions on issuing guaranteed debt, furthermore, meant that 
public officials wishing to fund capital projects would have to turn to 
nonguaranteed revenue bonds. 
Thus, following the research methods of the previous chapter, we evaluate the 
efficacy of the tax revolt era limitations by focusing on three questions: 
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(1) Do officials circumvent the limitations through the issuance of 
nonguaranteed debt? 
(2) If no evidence of circumvention is found, is it because the limits are not 
binding? 
(3) Are certain types of limitations (e.g., constitutional) more effective that 
others at constraining the amount of taxing and spending? 
4.1. The Question of Circumvention 
The first question we consider is whether the revenue and expenditure 
limitations enacted during the so-called Tax Revolt era induced states to issue 
more debt, in particular, more nonguaranteed debt. In order to examine this 
possibility, we calculated per capita full faith and credit debt and per capita 
nonguaranteed debt (in 1982 dollars) for those states that enacted revenue and 
expenditure limitations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as for those 
that did not. The results are displayed in the Figure 4.6.3 for each year 
between 1961 and 1990. If we look only at the figure for nonguaranteed debt, 
it appears that circumvention may be occurring. Those states with limitations 
incur lower levels of nonguaranteed debt until the late 1970s, at which point 
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they surpass those states that did not adopt any limitations. This result by 
itself, though, is misleading, because we have not examined whether the 
constraints on revenues and expenditures are binding (a necessary condition 
for circumvention). 
One (rough) procedure for determining the degree of constraint is to graph the 
average level of revenues and expenditures for those states with and without 
limits. If the gap between those states with and without limits shrinks 
because the rate of growth of revenues or expenditures declines in those states 
with limitations, then this may be an indication that the constraints are 
binding. That is, if the limitations cause states to restrict their levels of taxing 
and spending, we would expect to observe them hitting a "ceiling" after which 
the rate of growth of taxing and spending would stabilize or perhaps decline. 
Figure 4.6.3 about here 
The last two graphs in Figure 4.6.3 indicate per capita general revenues and 
expenditures rose just as fast in the 1980s in the Tax Revolt states as in the 
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other states. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies. 
According to Sears and Citrin (1985) and Herbers (1990), tax limitations have 
not had much impact primarily because restrictions on some taxes (income or 
property) were readily made up for by increases in user fees, and various taxes 
that do not fall within the bounds of the limitations (e.g., sin taxes and sales 
taxes). Gold (1988) reports that although the Tax Revolt has led to somewhat 
lower revenues and expenditures at the local level, there has been little effect 
at the state level. It is also the case that many of the provisions that were 
enacted were in the form of a limit on revenue as a percentage of personal 
income. During the long period of economic growth that followed the 1981-82 
recession, personal income in most states grew fairly rapidly. Thus, the most 
important reason why we do not support any circumvention hypotheses is that 
the tax revolt limitations do not appear to have been very effective in holding 
down either taxes or expenditures! The results of our analyses fail to support 
the contention that states circumvented Tax Revolt era limitations on revenue 
and expenditures through increased borrowing. 
4.2. The Bindingness of the Limitations 
The above results are only preliminary and need to be explored in greater 
detail and with more precision. Thus, we examined whether or not the 
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limitations were indeed binding and, if so, the possibility that a form of budget 
manipulation was occurring that went undetected in the other analysis. We 
calculated the bindingness of the limitations (listed in Table 4.5.2) for fourteen 
states: Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Washington.4 Figure 4.6.4 displays the leeway in the constraint for each state. 
If the graph shows a positive dollar amount or percentage, then the state is 
under the limit and has additional revenue available. If the graph shows 
negative values, then the state has exceeded the specified limit and is "in the 
red."5 
Figure 4.6.4 about here 
By grouping the states by type of limit (statutory or constitutional), a pattern 
emerges. Of the five states under statutory limitations, four exceed their 
constraint more times than they stay within it. Only Louisiana remains 
within its limit. It appears, however, that this result may be true simply 
because the limit has been set very high. If we look at the leeway before and 
after the limitation was implemented, we see an enormous growth in this gap 
in the five years following the limitation's approval. At no time since it was 
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instituted has the tax revolt limitation ever constrained state officials in 
Louisiana. 
On the other hand, of the five states that have constitutional limitations, four 
have remained within their constraint since the limits were implemented. 
Hawaii is the only state that fluctuates above and below the calculated limit. 
We inquired with state officials regarding this result, and they stated that 
Hawaii has remained within the constraint since it was enacted. They 
calculate the limit using an estimate of the total population, not the Bureau 
of the Census figure that we used in our calculation. This reason may explain 
why we observe the fluctuations above the limitation ceiling. Michigan 
appears to be the only state that may set limits so high as not to be binding 
(the other states all have leeways less than $1 billion). Interestingly enough, 
Michigan calculates its limit using the same formula as Louisiana, the only 
other state that has high ceiling. 
4.3. Constitutional Versus Statutory Limitations 
The above result should not give the impression that constitutional limitations 
always tightly bind the hands of state officials. Officials do retain power to 
include (and exclude) certain items in the calculation of the limit. California 
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represents an extreme version of this practice. During a telephone interview, 
we asked a state budget officer what general items are subject to the limit 
(Proposition 4). This individual could not respond precisely because, in her 
words, "the list changes so much from year to year." The greatest number of 
changes occur on the schedule of "Transfers from Excluded Funds to Included 
Funds." In fiscal year 1989-90, for example, five transfers were made 
compared to fiscal year 1991-92 during which over thirty exchanges were 
conducted (see California Governor's Budget, Schedule 13). Thus, what is on-
budget versus what is off-budget varies greatly from year to year, allowing for 
a great deal of slippage in the system. The gray area of exemptions from the 
limitations appears to give budget offers a fair amount of flexibility. 
On the other hand, some state officials and citizens appear to believe that 
constitutional restrictions constrain more effectively than statutory restrictions. 
In Colorado, for example, a statutory limitation was approved in 1977, 
constraining the yearly growth in state fund appropriations to 6%. In 1992, 
the voters amended this restriction by approving Constitutional Amendment 
#1 on the November ballot. This amendment also limits the amount of general 
fund appropriations, but ties increases to population growth in the state rather 
than a flat figure. The new amendment is more restrictive and allows the 
state less leeway for expenditures than under the statutory rule. The belief 
that constitutional amendments are more enforceable than statutory 
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amendments may stem from having more procedures to follow to amend them. 
Most constitutional limitations require at least a supermajority of the 
legislature or a referendum to amend, whereas statutory restrictions only 
require the enactment of another statutory amendment. 6 The extra steps 
required give constitutional amendments at least the appearance of 
constraining more effectively (though, this does not mean that there are not 
ways of skirting them as we saw earlier). 
To test further the questions of circumvention and bindingness and to examine 
the effectiveness of each type oflimitation, we controlled for variables that may 
affect the level of debt issued in a state using a theoretical and empirical model 
similar to that used in Chapter 3. In addition to the institutional variables 
used in the previous analysis, we create a variable for the type of limitation to 
test if, and to what degree, a constitutional restriction constrains taxing and 
spending more effectively than a statutory limitation. If a state has a 
constitutional limitation, then the constitutional dummy variable was assigned 
a "1"; otherwise, it received the value "0". Similarly, if the state has a 
statutory limit, the statutory variable was coded "1"; otherwise, it was given 
the value "0". Also, because of the sharp rise in debt over the past decade and 
a half, it is believed that credit rating agencies are playing a larger role in the 
politics of debt issuance. Moak (1982) asserts that, 
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"Exclusive reliance upon full faith and credit debt can result in an unwise 
overburdening of the pledge. Thus, when large investments in governmental 
enterprises are required, the aggregate debt can dilute the full faith and credit 
pledge to the point that the credit position of the community is endangered" (p. 
112). 
In particular, credit agencies become "nervous" when interest payments claim 
a significant percentage of general revenues and may lower a state's bond 
rating to reflect the "diluted" pledge. We test to see if such a threat directly 
affects the level of guaranteed versus nonguaranteed debt that a state issues. 
We arbitrarily chose 5% as a cutoff point, and created a dummy variable for 
those states that fall within this category. If a state's interest payments as a 
percent of general revenues exceeds 5%, the dummy variable is assigned a 
value of "1"; otherwise, its value is "0". We use this variable in a preliminary 
analysis to see its affects in conjunction with the type of revenue and 
expenditure limitation on the level of borrowing. 
We calculated the average change from 1979-1990 in real per capita 
guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt for states with constitutional limitations, 
states with statutory limitations, states with no limitations, and all states 
regardless of constraints. Then, we controlled for the credit rating phenomena 
discussed above, looking at the change in the same debt variables for the group 
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of states that were either above or below the prescribed cutoff point in 1979. 
The results are shown in Table 4.5.2 below: 
Table 4.5.2 about here 
The top portion of the table shows that those states with constitutional tax 
revolt limitations issued on average $146.20 less per person in full faith and 
credit debt in 1990 than in 1979. The change over time in states with 
statutory limitations or no limitations was far less dramatic ($12.80 and -
$77.80 per person, respectively). The difference between states with either 
constitution or statutory limitations was not as large ($437 .30 and $529.40, 
respectively). States with limitations, however, did issue more nonguaranteed 
debt than the average of all states combined, indicating that perhaps the tax 
revolt limitations do exert a slight, though by no means significant, pressure 
on borrowing tendencies. 
When we divide the states according to those with and without interest 
payments over 5% of general revenues, it does appear that the credit rating 
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threat is real. States with "high interest" payments (over the 5% cutoff) that 
may be considered a credit risk were issuing a good deal less guaranteed debt 
per person than states with low interest payments--$249.10 per person 
compared to -$53.3 per person. Moreover, these "higher credit risk" states 
increased their issuance of nonguaranteed debt by $553.30 per person as 
opposed to the latter group of states that increased nonguaranteed debt by only 
$407.10 per person. States with high interest payments, facing possible 
censure by credit agencies in the form of lower bond ratings, appear to have 
responded to this threat by issuing significantly lower levels of full faith and 
credit debt and higher amounts of nonguaranteed debt over the eleven year 
period when compared to those states with interest payments less than 5% of 
revenue. 
While this may only be a rough comparison, the results are interesting and 
should be explored further. We refined the examination by conducting a 
regression analysis, controlling for additional institutional factors such as the 
type of limitation. 7 From our previous analysis, we knew serial correlation in 
the panels would present a problem, so it was corrected by calculating the 
correlation coefficient for each state and then using this value in a generalized 
differencing model. The results are reported in Table 4.5.3 below: 
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Table 4.5.3 about here 
We regressed real per capita full faith and credit debt and real per capita 
nonguaranteed debt on the proscribed variables. The standard errors are 
located below the coefficients. Because most of the results are similar to those 
discussed in Chapter 3, we will concentrate on only new findings. Focusing on 
the type of limitation variables (constitutional versus statutory), it appears 
that states with statutory limitations have higher levels of guaranteed debt 
along with lower amounts of nonguaranteed debt. While this may seem to 
contradict our hypothesis that all forms of debt should increase if the tax 
limitations are binding, we know from our earlier analysis that 4 out of 5 
states exceeded their statutory limit. If statutory limitations are not binding, 
then issuing nonguaranteed debt as a means of circumventing the restriction 
is unnecessary. 8 The coefficients on the constitutional variable are negative 
(indicating lower levels of debt are held by states with constitutional 
limitations); however, these values are not significantly different from zero. 
This result is interesting in light of the fact that the limitations restricting the 
levels of full faith and credit borrowing, in particular, the referendum and 
dollar debt limit, are still constraining. It implies that the tax limitations may 
restrict revenues and expenditures, but are not as constraining as first 
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believed. These results confirm our earlier analysis, in that more than half the 
states (in particular, those with statutory limitations) use procedures to exceed 
their limits while those that remain within the limit usually do not face a very 
restrictive one (e.g., Louisiana). 
4.4. Conclusions 
Limitations on borrowing, taxing, and spending have been put into practice at 
the state and local level of governance for many years. These restrictions vary 
a great deal in their effectiveness. This chapter sought to quantify the 
bindingness of the restrictions on taxing and spending resulting from the Tax 
Revolt. We found that the states which were not bound by the constraints 
either exceeded the limit through legislative channels (e.g., approved 
amendments to the constitution) or established a limit so high as not to be 
binding. Further analysis is needed to determine what specific characteristics, 
if any, predetermine a state to fall into either of these categories. We 
speculate that the certain combinations of limitations (e.g., referendum and 
dollar debt limit) allow states to achieve one of these outcomes easily. 
Our results also demonstrate that certain types of limitations are more 
effective than others at constraining the choices made by state officials. In 
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particular, the constitutional tax revolt limitations on taxing and spending 
appear to be more restrictive than similar statutory ones. Statutory 
limitations were not so successful. Most states with this type of restriction 
exceeded their limit. Surpassing a defined limit through legislative channels 
seems much easier to achieve under statutory restrictions because they require 
only a new measure to replace it whereas under a constitutional limitation, 
several steps need to be taken, including, for example, a declaration of 
emergency from the governor, a referendum, etc. Constitutional limitations, 
however, may be exceeded because state officials maneuver items on- and off-
budget, as the earlier California example showed. We need to gather more 
information from other states before we can say if this phenomena gives 
budgetary officials much power. Thus, the effectiveness of tax revolt 
limitations can be judged as mixed. While they appear effective at first, upon 
further examination, in many cases (in particular, states with statutory limits), 
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Appropriations shall not exceed $2.5 billion by 
more than the cumulative percentage change 
in population and inflation since 7/ll81. 
Appropriations of state tax revenues shall not 
exceed 7 percent of state personal income. 
Yearly growth in appropriations limit shall not 
exceed percentage increase in population and 
inflation. 
Yearly growth of state general fund 
appropriations. 
98 percent of estimated general fund revenue 
and prior year's unencumbered funds. 
Growth of appropriations limited to rate of 
growth of state economy--defined as preceding 
3 years average growth rate of personal income 
(Act 277). 
Appropriations shall not exceed 5.33 percent of 
state personal income. 
Tax revenue shall not exceed: [(FY78-79 tax 
revenue)/(1977 state personal income)]. 
The average growth of wages and salaries of 
the previous 3 years. 
Revenue shall not exceed: [(FY78-79 state 
revenue)/(1977 state personal income)] x the 
greater of state personal income in prior 
calendar year or average state personal 
income over previous 3 calendar years. 
Revenue shall not exceed [(FY80-81 state 
revenue)/1979 state personal income)] x the 
greater of personal income in prior calendar 
year or average state personal income over 
previous 3 calendar years. 
State biennial appropriations shall not exceed 
state appropriations for the preceding 
biennium plus the product of preceding 
biennial appropriations and the growth 
percentage. The growth percentage is the 
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personal income for 3 calendar years 
immediately preceding the next biennium and 
the average state personal income for the 3 
calendar years immediately preceding the 
current biennium. 
(NON-BINDING) Proposed biennial 
expenditures authorized for the 1975-76 
biennium x (1 +percentage population change 
since 7/1/74) x (1 +percentage inflation). 
(Expired 1983) Fiscal year appropriations shall 
not exceed: FY state per capita income, prior 
state per capita income multiplied by 
appropriations in prior FY. 
(1) 12 percent yearly increase (adjusted for 
inflation) 
(2) 95 percent of certified revenue. 
The rate of growth of appropriations in each 
biennium shall not exceed rate of growth of 
state personal income in 2 preceding calendar 
years. 
Yearly growth in governor's general fund 
appropriations request shall not exceed 6 
percent. 
Yearly growth in state appropriations shall not 
exceed average growth of personal income over 
3 preceding years or 9.5 percent of total state 
personal income, whichever is greater. Also, 
the number of state employees is tied to state 
population. 
Growth in state appropriations shall not exceed 
growth in state personal income. 
Growth of biennial appropriations shall not 
exceed rate of growth of state personal income. 
(NEVER IMPLEMENTED) Growth in 
appropriations may not exceed 85 percent of 
the increase in state personal income. 
Washington 1979 Growth in tax revenues shall not exceed 
average rate of growth of state personal income 
over 3 years. 
Source: Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (1992), pp. 14-17. 
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Table 4.5.2. Average Growth of State Debt, 1979-1990 
Constitutional Statutory No Limit All 
Guaranteed 
Debt -146.2 12.8 -77.8 -73.3 
Non-
guaranteed 437.3 529.4 379.7 422.0 
Debt 
(Interest Rate 
as % of Revenue 
Greater than 5%) 
Guaranteed 
Debt -691.6 -479.9 -48.7 -249.1 
Non-
guaranteed 383.4 103.9 759.8 553.3 
Debt 
(Interest Rate 
as % of Revenue 
Less than 5%) 
Guaranteed 
Debt -93.6 67.6 -81.1 -53.3 
Non-
guaranteed 443.2 576.6 335.9 407.1 
Debt 
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Table 4.5.3. The Efficacy of State Limitations: 1979-1990 
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Figure 4.6.3 
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4. 7. Endnotes 
1. The decline in real disposable income was largely the result of inflation 
induced "bracket creep"; that is, many people were put into higher tax brackets 
because of rising inflation. 
2.While the amount of new debt issued by state and local governments was 
growing slowly through the 1970s, less and less was being invested in capital 
projects. According to the Government Finance Research Center (1983a), 
between 1968 and 1980 state and local government capital expenditures fell 
from over 37 percent, from $35.9 billion to $22.6 billion in constant (1972) 
dollars, or from $179 to $96 in per capita terms. Grants from the federal 
government for capital expenditures also fell during this period; in 1968 44 
percent of all federal aid to state and local governments was for capital 
projects, but by 1980 it was only 25 percent. Cumulatively, between 1968 and 
1980 total government investment in capital projects fell from 4.1 percent of 
GNP to 1.5 percent (p. 3). 
3.As several observers have noted, most nonguaranteed debt is issued by public 
corporations, special assessment districts, and other off-budget enterprises 
(Moak 1982; Bennett and DiLorenzo 1982; Hackbart et al. 1990). 
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4.We are still waiting to receive the necessary data from California, 
Massachusetts, and Texas. Alaska was not included in the study, and Nevada 
and Utah have limitations that officials state are non-binding or have never 
been implemented. New Jersey officials could not provide appropriations 
information for years earlier than 1983 (the same year that their tax revolt 
limitation expired). 
5.The referendum requirement allows a state to exceed its limit through a 
constitutional amendment; thus, a state may legally be "in the red." 
6.In general, constitutional amendments do not appear to be more enforceable 
in a court of law than statutory amendments; though, it may vary to some 
degree from state to state. 
7.A description of each variable, including source and reason for including it 
in the analysis, is provided in Chapter 3. 
8.As in Chapter 3, there exists the possibility that some of the independent 
variables are endogenous, particularly because the limits were enacted within 
the last ten to fifteen years. Thus, the behavior of states in certain policy 
areas may have influenced the choice of limitation and the choice of limitation 
may influence the behavior captured in some of the variables. We ran several 
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probability tests (e.g., probit and logit), but found no evidence of endogeneity. 
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5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to study the efficacy of self imposed 
limitations. In particular, it focused upon a set of restrictions instituted by 
most state governments over a hundred years ago; namely, limitations on full 
faith and credit borrowing. These restrictions, as discussed in Chapter 2, were 
incorporated in most state constitutions because of the massive defaults on 
bonds that occurred in the 1840s. Revenues were not sufficient to cover the 
sizeable debt; therefore, state govemments could not continue interest 
payments, let alone refunds on the principle investment. The restrictions 
became a means by which a state restored its credit worthiness. 
As we argued in Chapter 1, this overspending/borrowing bias can be traced, in 
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part, to the design of legislative government itself. Legislators want to 
continue legislating; therefore, they pursue policy conducive to getting them 
re-elected. This policy often involves spending programs because the benefits 
associated with such programs are directly visible to constituencies. Money 
must be raised to pay for these programs; however, and raising taxes is 
politically undesirable. Thus, governments often resort to borrowing to pay for 
costly spending programs. 
We argued that without any limits or rules, it is difficult to control the 
overspending/borrowing bias because elections are not effective, and the 
hierarchial system promotes collusion and vote trading, leading to suboptimal 
policy outcomes. Limitations or rules restricting the choices of democratically 
elected officials has been suggested by many scholars as a possible means of 
preventing these outcomes. Thus, the motivation behind this work was to 
measure to what extent limitations prevent or correct undesirable political 
outcomes, and if constitutional restrictions were as binding as many researcher 
have argued. 
For most of our analyses, the debt limitations were classified into five 
categories (only for our regression analysis did we separate states into 
mutually exclusive groupings). The results of our work placed the restrictions 
into definite categories of effectiveness. The referendum and dollar debt limits 
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both appeared to hold down the level of full faith and credit debt across all 
tests, while a supermajority of the legislature requirement seemed to allow 
legislatures to borrow more. Our preliminary analyses found little evidence to 
support a circumvention hypothesis (defined as a state actively skirting 
limitations on full faith and credit debt by issuing more nonguaranteed debt). 
It did show up in the regression calculations; however, the size of the affect 
was minuscule when compared to other influential factors such as crime rates, 
number of school age children, and most important, the limitation variables 
themselves. We concluded from this result that the states probably do not 
actively pursue such a policy with any rigor. 
Our regression analyses supported the efficacy of the dollar debt limit and the 
referendum requirement. This result, though, should be accepted with a 
degree of caution. When we examined the bindingness of the dollar debt limit 
more closely, we saw that halfofthe states did not actively issue full faith and 
credit debt, while the other half legally (and regularly) exceeded their limits. 
The same held true for the flexible debt limit, except instead of not issuing 
debt, many states set limits so high as not to be binding. 
In addition, while the constitutional limitations on taxing and spending that 
arose out of the Tax Revolt Era did not appear to contribute to more 
borrowing, the statutory limits did explain some of the increase in full faith 
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and credit borrowing and decrease in nonguaranteed debt. We hypothesized 
that if the tax revolt restrictions were binding, states would be forced to come 
up with revenues through issuing debt, in particular, nonguaranteed debt. 
Our regression results were obviously contrary to this prediction. After looking 
at the long term full faith and credit debt restrictions of these states, we 
conjecture that they issue more full faith and credit debt than other states 
because the limitations are not severely binding. Most of the states were 
restricted by a flexible debt limit (which we already found to be ineffective at 
controlling the level of debt) or a dollar debt limit with a provision that allowed 
it to be amended. Because the borrowing limits were not constraining, they 
could issue more full faith and credit debt without resorting to issuing 
nonguaranteed debt. Future research should examine this relationship more 
closely. 
If we have some limits that appear to control borrowing and little evidence 
exists for circumvention, how do states manage? We conclude that states 
pursue policies that legally skirt the limitations without appearing to 
circumvent them. First, states can hide long term debt by issuing bonds in 
short term denominations (one and two year bonds). By rolling over the bonds 
year after year, the debt becomes long term without having to fulfill the 
obligations associated with full faith and credit bonds. 
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The limits themselves can be manipulated to a certain extent. Many states, 
such as California, have the ability to move spending items off- and on-budget. 
Moving items off-budget exempts such debt from the borrowing and spending 
restrictions of the state. In addition, some states have clauses that allow them 
to exceed their limit for one or more years and several, such as Hawaii, can 
use estimated figures in their calculations that may bias the results in favor 
of remaining within the specified limits. 
Finally, as we saw earlier, it may just be the case that the limit set is not 
binding (as with many states subject to the flexible debt limit). In the early 
1980s, California authorized the issuance of more than $13 billion in bonds. 
It was not until the late 1980s, however, when Kathleen Brown became 
treasurer, that these bonds were actually issued. If the limitations were truly 
binding, we conjecture that this debt would have been issued much earlier in 
the decade. Because of their obvious effect on state fiscal practices, it appears 
that in addition to circumvention through the issuance ofnonguaranteed debt, 
the less obvious loopholes mentioned above should be included in any future 
analysis of the efficacy of the borrowing limitations. 
